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INTRODUCTION
This article is a study of the priorities between competing
claimants of land in South Carolina, both under the recording
act and under common law and equitable principles in the
absence of statute. The legislative scheme is inapplicable to
certain transfers of interests in land,' and even where applicable to other interests it embodies in large part much of
the previous non-statutory system.2 Therefore, a working
knowledge of the doctrines of priorities as developed in the
absence of statute is essential to an understanding of the
1. See page 355 et seq., infra.
2. It has been observed that the operation of the recording act in

South Carolina results from the treatment of a legal interest created by

an unrecorded instrument required by law to be recorded as a mere
equity to which is applied the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase
of the legal title for valuable consideration without notice. In Zorn v.
Railroad Co., 5 S. C. 90, 101 (1874), Mr. Justice Willard thus discusses
the theory and operation of the South Carolina recording act:
"The true rule on this subject is laid down by Chancellor Walworth
in Dickerson vs. Tillinghast, 4 Paige N. Y., 215. Chancellor Walworth
states the point so clearly, and exhibits the ground on which the construction of the Acts of registration rests, so far as it regards the requisites
to constitute a valuable consideration under those Acts, that a better
presentation cannot be made than that afforded by his language in the
case just cited. It will be observed that what he says in regard to the
construction of the registry laws of New York is directly applicable to
our own Acts. He says: 'The English registry Acts made the unregistered deed or incumbrance at law wholly inoperative and void, as against
a subsequent grantee or incumbrancer. But the Court of Chancery, in
accordance with the manifest spirit and intention of the statute, at an
early day adopted the principle of considering the prior deed or incumbrance as an equitable title or lien. It, therefore, applied to such cases,
the equitable principles which had previously been adopted by that
Court in relation to other contests between the holder of an equitable
title or lien and a subsequent grantee or mortgagee of the legal title. In
accordance with these principles, if the subsequent purchaser or mortgagee was a bona fide purchaser, that is, if he had actually parted with
his property on the credit of the estate, so as to give him an equitable
claim or specific lien thereon, without notice of the prior equity, and had
also clothed that equitable lien with the legal title by taking a deed or
mortgage, the Court would not divest him of that legal title or lien in
favor of the prior equity. But if he had notice of the prior equity at any
time before he had parted with his property on the credit of the estate,
and before he had united the subsequent equity with the legal title, he
was not considered as entitled to protection against the prior equity as
a bona fide purchaser.
"'The words bona fide purchaser, therefore, when introduced into
our recording and registry Acts, were intended to be used in conformity
with this established meaning thereof, and they must, in the present case,
receive the same construction which they had previously received in the
Court of Chancery in reference to that principle of equity. If a person
has an equitable title to, or an equitable lien upon, real estate, a subsequent purchaser who obtains a conveyance of the legal estate, with notice
of that equity, cannot, in conscience, retain such legal title, as he has no
equity united with it. So if he merely takes the legal estate in payment
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solutions to certain problems which have been reached in
South Carolina.
The writer's aim has not been the production of a dissertation upon the history of the recording statutes in South Carolina, but rather an exposition of the principles of priority
which prevail in present day South Carolina law. Despite this
avowed purpose, however, the bulk of historical material included is all too likely to impress the practitioner as unconscionable pedantry and antiquarianism of the worst order.
In extenuation it can only be said that it was felt necessary to
include this material in order that a clear view may be had of
the present South Carolina law.
The modern system of priorities of land titles is peculiarly
a product of the legislature, and in few, if any, other areas of
the law has the legislature been so ready to tinker with and
alter the structure erected by prior legislative sessions. The

first recording act in South Carolina dates from 1698,1 and
since that time the legislative architects have worked at more
or less frequent intervals either to alter drastically the design of the original plan, or else to remedy defects which
experience has shown to exist in the system.
The many questions of priority of land titles which have
confronted the South Carolina court in the main have been
problems of the legislative intent as expressed in the then
extant statutes. Since a subsequent change in the text of the
statute may nullify wholly or in large part the value of a
precedent, it is obvious that in evaluating the strength of
any prior decision as a present day authority the then language 'of the statute must be compared carefully with its
present formulation to insure that there has been no legislative alteration of the ratio decidendi. It is for this reason
that such detailed tracing of the history of the present day
recording system in South Carolina has been made. Wherever
possible, this material has been relegated to the footnotes,
where the reader may pursue it or not, as his particular problem may necessitate.
of or as security for a previous debt, without giving up any security,
or divesting himself of any right, or placing himself in a worse situation
than he would have been if he had received notice of the prior equitable

title or lien previous to his purchase, this Court will not permit him
to retain the legal title he has thus obtained to the injury of another.'"

3. 2 STAT. 137 (1698).
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As to the importance of the subject matter herein treated,
the reader, if not previously familiar with the fact, will be
impressed by the great number of situations where gaps in
the recording system theoretically make possible a loss to a
purchaser despite the most diligent search of the record. For-

tunately the judicial tables of title mortality show that statistically such instances occur with relative infrequency, and in
the great majority of cases defects in a title (other than those
caused by forgery, mental incapacity, and want of delivery)
will be reflected of record. However, the title examiner lives
by the record, and it is of importance that he be familiar with
the defects in the system upon which he daily stakes his professional reputation.

PRIORITIES ASIDE FROM STATUTE
In the absence of statute priority between conflicting legal
interests in land is determined by application of the maxim,
first in time, first in right. Thus a prior legal interest prevails over a subsequent one irrespective of the want of notice
to the subsequent purchaser of the legal title,4 unless some
circumstance estops the holder of the prior legal interest from
asserting such interest. 5
Where the contest is between equitable interests the same
rule as to the protection of the interest first created is in
general applied, G unless the holder of the earlier interest has
by his conduct (either affirmatively or by failure to act)
misled the subsequent purchaser for value as to the state of
the title, in which event the later equity is preferred.7 A con4. See, among other South Carolina cases, Donald v. McCord, Rice

Eq. 330, 340 (S. C. 1839) (personal property) ; (Shultz v. Carter, Speers
Eq. 533, 542 (S. C. 1844); Clark v. Smith, 13 S. C. 585, 601 (1879);
McMorris v. Webb, 17 S. C. 558, 563, 43 Am. Rep. 629 (1882); Sondley

v. Caldwell, 28 S. C. 580, 583, 6 S. E. 818 (1888). See 4 AMEmICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 17.1 p. 523; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1257 p. 3 (3rd
ed. 1939).

5. For a detailed discussion of the circumstances under which one
not a party to a transaction involving land will be estopped by a failure

to disclose his interest see Annot., 50 A. L. R. 668 (1927).
6. See, among other South Carolina cases, Bush v. Bush, 3 Strob.
Eq. 131, 134 (S. C. 1849); Brown v. Wood, 6 Rich. Eq. 155, 167 (S. C.
1853) (Circuit decree, personal property); Lynch v. Hancock, 14 S. C.
66, 90 (1880). See 4 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.1 p. 524; 5 TIF-

FANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1260 (3rd ed. 1939).
7. See Maybin v. Kirby, 4 Rich. Eq. 105, 114 (S. C. 1851) (rule
stated as to successive assignments of a chose in action). See 4 AmERI-
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siderable number of jurisdictions hold that even though the
equities are otherwise equal, the bona fide purchaser for value
of the later equity will prevail if he thereafter acquires the
legal title, even after notice of the outstanding prior equity.8
However, in South Carolina, 9 as in certain other jurisdictions,'0 it has been held that the purchaser of the later equity
cannot better his position by a subsequent acquisition of the

legal title after notice of the prior equity.
Where the contest is between a legal interest and an equitable one, the legal interest, if prior in time, will prevail."
However, if the equitable interest was first created, the
equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase will afford protection
to the subsequent purchaser of the legal title only if the legal
title was acquired for a valuable consideration and without
2
notice of the prior equity.'

This in general is the common law system of priorities,
upon which the American mosaic of title recordation has been
inlaid.
II
HISTORY OF THE RECORDING ACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The first South Carolina legislation for the protection of
subsequent grantees and mortgagees of land seems to be the
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.2; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1260 (3rd ed.
1939). It seems that even though the conduct of the holder of the prior
equity has not been such as to constitute an estoppel, yet the court may
prefer the later equity. Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, 57, 5 L. Ed.
393 (U. S. 1822); Hume v. Dixon, 37 Ohio St. 66 (1881). 4 AIERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.2; 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 413-415
(5th ed. 1941).
8. See cases cited in 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.2 n. 6; 5
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1261 n. 29.
9. South Carolina cases to this effect include Bush v. Bush, 3 Strob.
Eq. 131, 51 Am. Dec. 675 (S. C. 1849) ; Jones v. Godwin, 10 Rich. Eq. 226
(S. C. 1858); Lynch v. Hancock, 14 S. C. 66, 90 (1880); Lake v. Shumate, 20 S. C. 23, 24 (1883) (decree of circuit judge).
10. See cases cited in 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1261 n. 29 (3rd
ed. 1939).
11. Among the many South Carolina cases to this effect, see Blake v.
Heyward, Bailey Eq. 208, 221 (S. C. 1831) ; Clark v. Smith, 13 S. C. 585,
601 (1879); Hardin v. Melton, 28 S. C. 38, 45, 4 S. E. 805, petition for
rehearing dismissed 9 S. E. 423 (1888); Sweatman v. Edmunds, 28 S. C.
58, 62, 5 S. E. 165 (1888) (in which case the applicability of the doctrine is doubtful, however). See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.1;
5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1258 (3rd ed. 1939).
12. See Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 36, 134 S. E. 859 (1926), and
the many cases therein cited.
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Act of 1698,13 entitled "An act to prevent deceits by double
mortgages and conveyances of lands, negroes and chattels,
etc." The preamble recites the hardships which have resulted
from the opportunity given to "knavish and necessitous persons to make two or more sales, conveyances and mortgages
of the same plantation, negroes and other goods and chattels.
•.. " For remedy it is provided (as to land) "That that sale,
conveyance, or mortgage of lands and tenements, except original grants, which shall be first registered in the Register's
Office in Charleston, shall be... held to be the first sale, conveyance and mortgage, and to be good.., in all courts...
within South Carolina, any form or other sale, conveyance or
mortgage of the same land not before registered notwithstanding.... " All deeds and mortgages executed prior to passage
of the act were to be recorded before 1 June, 1699, or lose their
priority to subsequently recorded instruments. The act further
provided that should the Register furnish a false certificate
that no instruments affecting a title had been recorded with
him, he should be liable to the person making such inquiry for
the damages sustained as a consequence of such false certification.
An act in 173114 recites the beneficial effect of the requirement of registration of conveyances, and provides "That the
recorder or register of deeds or conveyances of land and mortgages shall be and continue separated and distinct from any
other office or officer whatsoever. . . ." Other sections 5 provided for the registration of all lands held either by original
patent or grant, which the Act of 1698 had not required, as
well as by mesne conveyance, within eighteen months after
passage of the act, on penalty of having title to land not so
registered deemed vacant land subject to claim by any person.
Leasehold estates are expressly excluded from the provisions
of the act.'" Saving clauses in favor of minors, feme coverts
and persons residing without the Province, and provisions for
proof of lost or destroyed deeds are included.

13. 2 STAT. 137 (1698).
14. 3 STAT. 296 (1731).
15. 3 STAT. 290-293 (1731).
16. 3 STAT. 291 (1731). Subsequent acts provided for the recording
of marriage contracts and settlements [4 STAT. 656 (1785), 5 STAT. 203

(1792), 6 STAT. 213 (1823)) and of leases for a term longer than twelve
months [6 STAT. 67 (1817)].
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The forty-fifth section 17 of the Act of 1785, entitled "An
act establishing county courts, and for regulating the proceedings therein," apparently constitutes the next major development in the recording legislation of South Carolina. It was
thereby provided "That no conveyance of lands.., shall pass
...
from one person.., to another, any estate of inheritance
in fee simple, or any estate for life . . . unless the same be
made in writing.., recorded in the clerk's office of the county
where the land.., shall lie .... " Recordation must be within
six months after execution and delivery in the case of grantors
residing within the state, one year in the case of grantors
residing in other states of the United States, and within two
years in the case of grantors residing without the United
States, "and if any . . . conveyances shall not be recorded
within the respective times before mentioned, such . . . conveyances shall be legal and valid only as to the parties themselves and their heirs, but shall be void and incapable of barring the rights of parties claiming as creditors, or under subsequent purchases, recorded in the manner hereinbefore prescribed .... "
Four years after the Act of 1785 it was found desirable to
extend the time of compliance with the recording requirements
thereof until one year after the enactment of a statute in
1789,18 because of the recited fact that the title of the Act of
1785 had not sufficiently given notice of the recordation requirements thereof.
In 1843 the law as to the recordation of mortgages was
altered by a provision "That no mortgage ... of real estate,
shall be valid so as to affect the rights of subsequent creditors
or purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice, unless the same shall be recorded.., within sixty days from the
execution thereof.... ,9
With minor exceptions the essential text of the recording
statutes remained unchanged until 1872,20 when "an act to
more effectually provide for the recording of all conveyances
17. 7 STAT. 232 (1785).
18. 5 STAT. 127 (1789).

19. 11 STAT. 277 (1843).
20. See REV. STAT. Ch. LXXXII, approved by Act of the General Assembly, 10 Feb. 1872.
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of real estate" 21 was enacted. It was therein provided "That
every conveyance of real estate ... shall, within thirty-three
days, be recorded ... and every such conveyance, not so recorded, shall be void, as against any subsequent purchases,
in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, of the same
real estate... Provided, such subsequent purchaser shall have
first recorded his said conveyance."
In 1876 the basic text of the recording law again was altered
by "an act to provide an uniform registry law for all deeds
and other instruments in writing required to be recorded." 22
This act provided "That all deeds or conveyances of land...
shall be valid, so as to affect from the time of such delivery
or execution the rights of subsequent creditors or purchasers
for valuable consideration without notice, only when recorded
within forty days from the time of such delivery or execution
... Provided,nevertheless, That... if recorded subsequent to
the expiration of said period of forty days, shall be valid to
affect the rights of subsequent creditors and purchasers for
valuable consideration without notice only from the date of
such record."
With but one exception 23 all subsequent recording legislation
stems from the Act of 1876, and despite the many amendments
since made, the essential language of that act is embodied in
the present law of the state.24 These amendments, and the effects thereof, will be discussed in the treatment of the present
law.
21. 15 STAT. 5 (1872).
22. 16 STAT. 92 (1876).
23. In 1916 the Torrens System of land registration was enacted, to
become effective July 1, 1916 (29 STAT. 943). In his comprehensive survey of the status of the Torrens System in the United States, Professor
McCall makes the following comment upon the system in South Carolina:
"A prominent attorney of Columbia, S. C., wrote in a letter dated
March 8, 1932: 'The Torrens statute was passed in this state a good
many years ago, but so far as I know the system has never been used
at all in this state.' The Lawyer and Banker's [16 LAwYER AND BANKER
37 (1922)] table shows that up to August 25, 1922, only 71 titles had
been registered." McCall, The Torrens System--After Thirty-five Years,
10 N. C. L. REv. 329, 336 (1932).
While no formal repeal of the act has been found, it would seem no
longer to be law in view of its omission from the CODE OF LAws of 1922
and all subsequent codes. S. C. CONST. 1895, art. 6 § 5. Nexsen v. Ward,
96 S. C. 313, 80 S. E. 599 (1914) ; Paris Mt. Water Co. v. Greenville, 105
S. C. 180, 89 S. E. 669 (1916).
24. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101.
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A. In general
25

The statute prescribes that the following instruments affecting title to land shall be recorded: "[a] 11 deeds of conveyance of lands, tenements or hereditaments, either in fee simple
or for life ... deeds of trust or instruments in writing conveying.., real.., estate, creating a trust in regard to such
property or charging or encumbering it, . . . mortgages ...
marriage settlements ... leases or contracts in writing made
between landlord and tenant for a longer period than twelve
months . . . statutory liens on buildings and lands for materials or labor furnished on them ... certificates of renunciation of dower... contracts for the purchase and sale of real
property . . . assignments, 26 satisfactions, releases and contracts in the nature of subordinations, waivers and extensions
of landlords' liens, sharecroppers' liens or other liens on real
or personal property or both, created by law or by agreement
of the parties and generally all instruments required by law
to be recorded .... "
Despite the broad language of the statute serious questions
are raised as to its applicability to certain transfers of interests in land. The applicability or non-applicability of the re25. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101.

26. By virtue of legislation enacted in 1924 (33 STAT. 928) a release
or satisfaction of the lien of a mortgage of real proper- made by the
record owner of such mortgage is valid for the protection of a subsequent
purchaser for value or a subsequent creditor obtaining a lien on the property, notwithstanding the existence of an unrecorded assignment, unless
such creditor or purchaser, prior to the acquisition of his interest, had
notice of the unrecorded assignment. As subsequently amended this statute now constitutes CODE OF LAwS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-103. In

1934 (38 STAT. 1521) the general recording act also was amended to provide for the recordation of mortgage assignments and contracts in the
nature of subordinations, waivers and extensions. See text of the recording act, set out above.
Prior to the act of 1924, supra, persons protected thereby dealt
with the record holder of a mortgage at their peril. Williams v. Paysinger, 15 S. C. 171 (1881); Singleton v. Singleton, 60 S. C. 216, 38

S. E. 462 (1901); Union National Bank of Columbia v. Cook, 110 S. C.
99, 96 S. E. 484 (1918). It is improbable that the act will be construed
to afford protection to subsequent assignees of the mortgage. Also, it
seems obvious that the recordation of the assignment of a mortgage is
not constructive notice to the mortgagor. The mortgagor in such a case
is not a subsequent but a prior party, and his rights, therefore, would
be affected only by the law of assignments.
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cording act to legal interests acquired by adverse possession
or presumption of a grant, by prescription, by implication, by
bankruptcy, and to equitable interests acquired by way of
estoppel in pais,27 parol gift, or sale, constructive or resulting
trusts, the right of reformation of an instrument, and the right
of reinstatement of a mortgage present problems which necessitate careful analysis.
B. Adverse possession
Suppose that in 1930 A wrongfully went into possession of
a tract of land in South Carolina owned by B, and continuously occupied it under circumstances which gave him title
thereto by adverse possession after the expiration of ten
years 28 in 1940. Suppose further that A then moved off the
land, which remains vacant until 1953, when it is sold and conveyed by B to C, who pays value in reliance upon B's perfect
record title, and with no knowledge of any infirmity therein.
A then brings action against C to recover possession of the
land. Is the recording act a defense to C?
The general rule, apparently law in South Carolina, 29 is that
a title acquired by adverse possession is one to which the
recording act has no application. 30 Thus in a leading case, 1
the facts of which closely parallel those in our hypothetical
situation, it was held that the title acquired by adverse possession was superior to the claim of the subsequent bona fide
purchaser of the record title, the court stating: " [ t] itles matured under the statute of limitations, are not within the recording acts. However expedient it might be to require some
27. See note 79, infra, for a discussion of the nature of an interest in
land created by an estoppel in pais.
28. In South Carolina the period prescribed for the acquisition of title
to land by adverse possession is ten years. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-124, 10-126, 10-127, 10-2421.
29. Cabiness v. Mahon, 2 McC. 273 (S. C. 1822), discussed in note 36,
infra; Gordon v. Parsons, 1 Bay 37 (S. C. 1786).
30. Faloon v. Simshauser, 130 Ill. 649, 22 N. E. 835 (1889) ; Lowi v.
David, 134 Miss. 296, 98 So. 684 (1924); Ridgeway v. Holliday, 59 Mo.
444 (1875); Schall v. Williams Valley R. Co., 35 Pa. 191 (1860); MacGregor v. Thompson, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 32, 26 S. W. 649 (1894); East
Texas Land etc. Co. v. Shelby, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 685, 41 S. W. 542
(1897) ; Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wash. 2d 429, 206 P. 2d 332, 9 A. L. R. 2d
846 (1949). See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 545; 4 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPEaqTY § 1.8 p. 553; Annot., 9 A. L. R. 2d 850 (1950); Ferrier, The Recording Acts & Titles by Adverse Possession & Prescription,14 CALIF.
LW REVIW 287 (1926).
31. Schall v. Williams Valley R. Co., 35 Pa. 191 (1860).
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public record of such titles to be kept, and however inconvenient it may be to purchasers to ascertain what titles of
that sort are outstanding, still we have not as yet any legislation on the subject, and it is not competent for judicial decision to force upon them consequences drawn from the recording acts. These acts relate exclusively to written titles ...
So long as we retain this statute [of limitations], and hold
it in so high esteem, conveyancers and purchasers should not
content themselves with merely searching registries, which
were an invention consequent upon written titles, but they

should make themselves familiar with the history of the possession .... And if they would be relieved of this necessity,
they must get the legislature to contrive a mode of putting this
kind of title on the public records. 'Til that is done, the courts
will be obliged to give effect to such titles without regard to
records."
Since the South Carolina legislature has imposed no requirements nor provided any method for the recordation of titles
acquired by adverse possession, such titles would appear to be
entirely without the operation of the recording statutes. 32
32. It is true that the adverse possessor who has acquired title by
running of the statutory period may assert affirmatively the title acquired by him. Harrelson v. Sarvis, 39 S. C. 14, 17 S. E. 368 (1893);
Busby v. Ry., 45 S. C. 312, 23 S. E. 50 (1895); Duren v. Kee, 50 S. C.
444, 27 S. E. 875 (1897). It further seems clear that such adverse possessor may maintain an action to quiet title against the holder of the
paper title. Brevard v. Fortune, 221 S. C. 117, 69 S. E. 2d 355 (1952).
See Annot., 78 A. L. R. 24, 110 (1932). However, the institution of
such an action would appear to rest entirely in the option of the adverse
possessor. In Ridgeway v. Holliday, 59 Mo. 444, 455 (1875), the court
made the following observation: "Whether it is incumbent on the owner,
by adverse possession, to perpetuate the evidence of his title by proceeding to remove the cloud thereon, occasioned by the existence of the
record title in another, so as to affect subsequent purchasers with notice,
it is not necessary to inquire." (This because the court found that the
subsequent purchaser could not qualify as one without notice.) In the
absence of statutory duty to bring such an action imposed upon the adverse possessor it would seem that his failure to do so could in no way
inure to the benefit of the record title holder or a bona fide purchaser
from him. For suggested legislative reform of this undesirable situation
see Ferrier, The Recording Acts & Titles by Adverse Possession & Prescription, 14 CALiF. LAW RaV. 287, 296 (1926).
A Pennsylvania statute provides a method whereby a person who has
acquired title by adverse possession may file a record of his claim. PuRDON'S PA. STATUTES, 1936, tit. 68, c. 2, § 86 of the statute provides:
"Unless a statement of claim be made and recorded as herein provided,
no title to lands by twenty-one years' adverse possession, as aforesaid,
shall avail against any purchaser, mortgagee, or judgment creditor for
value, without notice, his heirs and assigns, except the claimant be in
possession of such lands at the time of such purchase."
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C. Adverse possession by grantee under an unrecordeddeed
Suppose a grantee of land under a valid but unrecorded deed
has been in possession for more than the statutory period
necessary to establish title by adverse possession. Thereafter
his grantor sells and conveys the land to a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice of the prior unrecorded deed. Can
the first grantee establish title to the land by adverse possession and thus avoid the consequences of the nonrecordation
of his deed? In an Alabama case3 3 the question was answered
in the affirmative, the court holding that the grantee under
the unrecorded deed having acquired title by adverse possession, his failure to record his deed therefore was immaterial.
The practical consequence of such a holding is readily apparent. If the grantee under an unrecorded deed has held
possession for the statutory period necessary to acquire title
by adverse possession (ten years in South Carolina3 4 ), his
failure to record thereafter becomes immaterial, and reliance
upon the record by a subsequent purchaser is futile. Thus the
uncertainty existing as to the fortunately rare title founded
solely upon adverse possession is multiplied ten thousand
times, a result clearly inimical to the proper functioning of
the recording system.
The hiatus in the reasoning of the Alabama court would
seem to be the assumption that an owner of land can acquire title thereto by adverse possession in derogation of his
subsisting title; i. e., that a person can hold adversely to himself. The proposition at best is dubious, 35 and when considered
as an original one it would seem that before espousing it a
court should weigh carefully its destructive effect upon the
integrity of the recording system.
Unfortunately two early cases 36 which antedate the better
known Alabama case held the doctrine to be law in South
33. Winters v. Powell, 180 Ala. 425, 61 So. 96 (1912); s. c. on a subsequent appeal sub nom. Nolen v. Powell, 64 So. 566 (1913).
34. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-124.
35. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1177 at p. 508 (3rd ed. 1939); 26
HARv. L. REv. 762 (1913). But see Ferrier, The Recording Acts & Titles
by Adverse Possession & Prescription,14 CALIF. L. REV. 287, 289 (1926).
See also OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 545 n. 64.
36. Gordon v. Parsons, 1 Bay 37 (S. C. 1786); Cabiness v. Mahon,
2 McC. 273 (S. C. 1822). In the Cabiness case, the action was trespass
to try title. The plaintiff was a purchaser for value of the record title
without notice of a prior unrecorded deed to the defendant. The defendant had been in possession under his deed for more than the statutory
period, but the court found that the circumstances of the possession were
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Carolina. It is to be hoped that if the question is again presented the South Carolina court will not hesitate to repudiate
these earlier decisions.

D. Prescriptiveeasements
Where a prescriptive easement burdening land has been

obtained, does a subsequent purchaser of the servient tenement purchasing in reliance upon the record title and without

notice of the easement 7 take free thereof? In view of the
answer which the courts have uniformly reached in the adverse possession situation,38 it would seem necessarily to
follow that the subsequent purchaser likewise would take subject to an easement obtained by prescription. However, on
this point the limited body of authority is not in accord, some
courts39 holding that the subsequent purchaser without notice
not sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice of the defendant's
claim. The trial judge charged the jury that the defendant's deed not
having been recorded, the plaintiff must prevail under his subsequent
deed. On appeal from judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff, a new
trial was granted, the appellate court stating (at p. 275) :
"[I]t appears that the defendant's title by possession was regarded
as contaminated by his paper title. That a party may succeed on his
possession when he has failed to prove a paper title, is not now to be
questioned. Where adverse possession ... is proved, a written muniment
is of no other use than to show the extent of his possession. The defendant had twenty years possession of this land. During the whole of that
period he held adversely to Wright [the common grantor of plaintiff
and defendant]. The deed of Wright was unimportant to the defendant
after the first five years [the then period of the statute of limitations],
except to show the extent of his possession; and this might be done by evidence much less formal than a deed duly executed and recorded in the
register's office."
See also Beck v. Northwestern R. Co. of S. C., 105 S. C. 319, 89 S. E.
1018 (1916), wherein the plaintiff claimed to have purchased land without actual or record notice (because the deed was not probated) of a
grant of a right of way easement to the defendant's predecessor by
plaintiff's predecessor in title. The lower court's judgment for the defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the principal ground
that the record in the case did not disclose the plaintiff to be a purchaser
without notice. However, the court further said (105 S. C. at p. 327):
"Under the grant of [plaintiff's predecessor]

. . . though improperly

recorded, the defendant and its predecessors, for over 21 years before
plaintiff purchased, had been claiming the easement in question under
a paper title duly signed and witnessed. This alone was sufficient to
ripen the claim of easement of defendant into such title as to defeat the
claim of plaintiff as purchaser to compensation for the lands taken actually and claimed by it under the grant." (Emphasis added.)
37. As to what circumstances will be sufficient to charge a purchaser
of the servient estate with notice of the existence of the easement, see
p. 389, post.
38. See page 356, supra.
39. McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 29 N. W. 2d 518 (1947);
Riggs v. Ketner, 299 Ky. 754, 187 S. W. 2d 287 (1945); Shaughnessey
v. Leary, 162 Mass. 108, 38 N. E. 197 (1894); Ferguson v. Standley,
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takes subject to the prescriptive easement, while another40
has held, and others 41 indicated, that the bona fide purchaser
of the record title takes free of easements of which he had no
42
notice.
A sophistical rationalization has been suggested to explain
the different treatment afforded titles by adverse possession
and easements by prescription under the recording acts. Title
by adverse possession is obtained by virtue of the statute of

limitations barring the remedy of the paper title holder, while
an easement by prescription rests upon the fiction of a presumed lost grant.43 Spelling out the consequences of the theory
of prescription, "[t] he fiction is extended to holding that the
grant should have been recorded before it was
presumed
lost. 44 Mention is made of this possible rationalization for
subjecting the prescriptive easement to the requirements of
the recording act, since, if it should be applied in South Carolina, a further logical consequence would necessitate a similar treatment of the title to land acquired by presumption of
a grant.
E. Presumptionof a grant
It is familiar law to the South Carolina practitioner that in
this state the fiction of the presumed lost grant is not only
89 Mont. 489, 300 Pac. 245 (1931); Heard v. Bowen, 184 S. W. 234
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916). 3 POwELL, REAL PROPERTY § 434 p. 502.
40. Schwartz v. Atlantic Building Co., 41 App. D. C. 108 (1913).
41. Schmidt v. Brown, 226 Ill. 590, 80 N. E. 1071, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.)
457, 17 Am. St. Rep. 261 (1907); St. Cecilia Society v. Universal, etc.,
Co., 213 Mich. 569, 182 N. W. 161 (1921) ; Van De Vanter v. Flaherty,
37 Wash. 218, 79 Pac. 794 (1905). See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 545; Ferrier, The Recording Acts & Titles by Adverse Possession & Prescription,
14 CALIF. L. REv. 287, 291 (1926). No South Carolina case has been
found.
42. A similar conflict exists when an easement created other than
by deed has been acquired by the public, either by so-called prescription
or by common law dedication. There are cases stating that the subsequent purchaser takes free of such interests of which the purchaser had
no notice. See Poskey v. Bradley, 209 Ark. 93, 189 S. W. 2d 806, 810
(1945); 26 C. J. S. 536. However, in South Carolina it may be that
the subsequent purchaser takes subject thereto, despite his want of notice.
See Frost v. Columbia Clay Co., 130 S.C. 72, 124 S. E. 767 (1924).
43. Lamb v. Crosland, 4 Rich. 536 (S.C. 1851). 4 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1191 (3rd ed. 1939).
44. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 544. Professor Osborne further comments
(at page 545): "This explanation has merit only to the extent that the
policy of the recording acts justifies invalidation of secret legal interests
even though they are unrecordable and could not readily be made recordable - a step that seems entirely too drastic." See also Ferrier,
The Recording Acts & Titles by Adverse Possession & Prescription,14
CALIF. L. REV. 287, 292 (1926) ; BuRBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw Or REAL
PROPERTY 126 (2d ed. 1954).
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the basis for the acquisition of prescriptive easements but
also may be relied upon to establish title to land under cirhas
cumstances where a claim under the statute of limitations
45
not yet ripened into a title by adverse possession.
Since the acquisition of title to land by presumption of a
grant is analogous to the prescription of an easement in that
both are founded upon the fiction of a presumed lost grant,
on the basis of the above mentioned 46 rationalization of decisions from other states involving easements by prescription,
it may be argued that while a title by adverse possession is
not within the scope of the recording act, a title by presumption of a grant is within its terms. As above pointed out,47
however, the ground of such a distinction seems specious, and

it is unlikely that the South Carolina court will give to the title
by presumption of a grant a treatment different from that afforded titles by adverse possession.
F. Easements by implication

While easements created by express grant very generally
48
are considered to be within the terms of the recording acts,
45. Trustees of Wadsworthville Poor School v. Jennings, 40 S. C.
168, 18 S. E. 257 (1893). See Smith v. Asbell, 2 Strob. 141 (S. C. 1847);
Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S. C. 61, 115 S. E. 727 (1923). For example,
A goes into adverse possession of O's land and holds it for seven years.
A then conveys to B, who holds for seven more years before conveying
to C. The statute of limitations in South Carolina is ten years. CODE OF
LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-124, 10-126, 10-127, 10-2421. However, in South Carolina adverse possessions may not be tacked by grantor
and grantee to make out the statutory period. See Garrett v. Weinberg,
48 S. C. 28, 26 S. E. 3 (1896), and the many South Carolina cases collected in 2 C. J. 86, note 46; 2 C. J. S. 688, notes 75, 76. Therefore, even
though 0 has been disseised for a total of fourteen years, he can still
maintain ejectnent against C. However, where a claimant of land is
proceeding on the theory of the presumption of a grant (twenty years),
tacking between grantor and grantee is permitted. Thomson v. Peake,
7 Rich. 353 (S. C. 1854); Sutton v. Clarke, 59 S. C. 440, 38 S. E. 150
(1901). See Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S. C. 61, 115 S. E. 727 (1923).
Therefore, if C holds adversely for seven more years (making a total of
twenty-one years during which 0 has been disseised) C will have acquired title by presumption of a grant, even though he has no title by
adverse possession. For a fuller discussion of this and other important
distinctions between adverse possession and presumption of a grant in
South Carolina, see Means, Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land in
South Carolina:A Title Examinees Guide, 5 S. C. L. Q. 313, 354 (1953).
46. See p. 360, supra.
47. See p. 360, supra.
48. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.8; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 828 (3rd ed. 1939). The language "tenements or hereditaments" in
the South Carolina statute [CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §
60-1012 is inclusive of easements appurtenant, profits i prendre (both
appurtenant and in gross) and, it seems, of easements in gross. See 42
AM. JuR., Property §§ 16, 17 (1942). Henry v. Southern Ry., 93 S. C.
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the applicability of such acts to implied easements 49 created
by duly recorded instruments is a question to which American
case law affords no uniform answer. Thus some cases o have
held that an innocent purchaser of the servient estate takes
free of implied easements of which he had no notice, while
others9 ' have declared the hapless purchaser subject thereto.
While a logical interpretation of the recording act would seem
to favor the dominant tenant,5 2, 53 yet the broad policy of the
125, 75 S. E. 1018 (1912) would seem not to be authority to the contrary.

49. The term is inclusive of ways of necessity.
50. Mesmer v. Uharriet, 174 Cal. 110, 162 Pac. 104 (1916); Hawley
v. McCabe, 117 Conn. 558, 169 Atl. 192 (1933); Backhausen v. Mayer,
204 Wis. 286, 234 N. W. 904, 74 A. L. R. 1245 (1931) ; Schmidt v. HiltyForster Lumber Co., 239 Wis. 514, 1 N. W. 2d 154 (1941).
51. Such seems to be the holding of the following cases: Logan v.
Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372, 24 N. E. 135 (1890) ; Thomas v. McCoy, 48 Ind.
403, 96 N. E. 14 (1911) ; Zimmerman v. Cockey, 118 Md. 491, 84 Atl. 743
(1912); Wissler v. Hershey, 23 Pa. 333 (1854); Wiesel v. Smira, 49
R. I. 246, 142 Atl. 148, 58 A. L. R. 818 (1928).
52. "It is submitted that no one should be prejudiced by the operation
of the recording act when he has not omitted any step required thereby.
In fact, those acts in no proper sense create rights (except as a subsequent purchaser for value may take free of interests created by instruments not recorded as required); they merely require certain steps by an
What
owner in order to preserve his rights [italics in original] ....
more could X (the grantee by a recorded deed of an implied easement
of necessity] have done . . . to save his rights, so far as the recording
act was concerned? It is true that he might have insisted on his way
being provided for expressly in his deed, but that could hardly have
been required by the recording act, certainly no more so than a deed can
be said to be required by one who acquires ownership by prescription
or adverse possession. It may be said in justification of the result
reached in the principal case that it is desirable to cut off easements by
implication as against innocent purchasers of the servient land, and that
to hold otherwise would place an almost impossible burden upon the
searcher of titles, whether he be a prospective purchaser, attorney, or
abstractor. But it is submitted that such result cannot properly be
reached by applying the recording act.... The enactment of a statute
expressly dealing with implied easements would seem to present a better
method of reaching the desired end." 29 MIcH. L. REv. 1083, 1084
(1931) (casenote criticizing Backhausen v. Mayer, note 50, supra).
53. The text writers and law review commentators appear to favor
the dominant tenant. See WALSII, MORTGAGES 142; OSBORNE, MORTGAGES
546; Ferrier, The Recording Acts & Titles by Adverse Possession &
Prescription, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 287, 295 (1926) ; 29 MICH. L. Rav. 1083
(1931) (quoted in note 52, supra). But see 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 793 at p. 294, § 828 at p. 399 (3rd ed. 1939) ; 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
§ 424 at p. 502 (indicating that while a conveyance of the servient estate
to a bona fide purchaser without notice extinguishes an implied easement, such conveyance may not extinguish an easement by necessity).
The encyclopedias appear to favor the subsequent purchaser. See 17
AM. JuR., Easements § 128; 19 C. J., Easements § 147 p. 940. However,
their treatment would seem inadequate and without appreciation of the
scope of the problem. See Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R. I. 246, 142 Atl. 148,
58 A. L. R. 818 (1928) for a critical appraisal of the encyclopedic authorities. This case occasioned additional text statement in 28 C. J. S.,
Easements § 50 p. 715.
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act weighs in favor of the subsequent purchaser.

4

No South

Carolina case considering the question has been found.
G. Bankruptcy proceedings

A

section 55

of the Chandler Act of 1938 provides in sub-

stance that a state may authorize the recording of a certified
copy of the bankruptcy petition with the schedules omitted,

the decree of adjudication, or the order approving the trustee's bond, in the office where conveyances of real property

are recorded. Unless such recordation has been made in the
county where the land is situated, a bona fide purchaser or
lienor without actual notice of the bankruptcy proceedings is

protected, except where the land lies in the county in which
is kept the original records of the bankruptcy proceeding.

In 1939, South Carolina enacted a statute 6 in compliance with

the above provisions of the Chandler Act. This would seem
to eliminate the previous uncertainty 57 as to the necessary extent of bankruptcy search by the examiner of land titles in
South Carolina.
H. Mechanics liens5 s

In South Carolina a mechanic's lien is by the terms of the

recording act 59 required to be recorded so as to affect subsequent parties without notice thereof. The fact that under the
mechanic's lien statutes a claimant has a grace period of

ninety days within which to file statement of his lien60 does
not afford him priority over a subsequent mortgagee or pur-

chaser for value without notice.6 '
54. "The maintenance of the effectiveness of our registry system
requires that one who relies in good faith upon a record title apparently
complete shall be protected against any claimed interest not of record,
of which he has no notice. . . . In the absence of actual notice of the
existence of an easement or of physical facts which would put him upon
inquiry, one purchasing property may rely upon the land records to disclose the existence of such a charge upon the property." Hawley v.
McCabe, 117 Conn. 558, 169 Atl. 192 (1933).
55. 52 STAT. 840 c. 575 § 21 (g); 11 U. S. C. A. § 44.
56. 41 STAT. 185 (1939); CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
§ 60-66.
57. See PATTON, LAND TITLES § 355 and 1952 Pocket Part Supplement
thereto at p. 223.
58. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 tit. 45 c. 5.
59. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101.
60. CODE! OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 45-259.
61. Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S. C. 1, 96 S. E. 407 (1913)
(mortgage lien afforded priority). As to the perfection of the lien see
Lowndes Hill Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co., 229 S. C. 619, 93
S. E. 2d 855 (1956).
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I. Lien of judgment upon property of railroador street
railway corporation
A statute 2 provides that a judgment obtained against a
railroad or street railway corporation by any person for personal injury or injury to property, or by a municipality for
injury to its streets or highways, shall relate back to the date
when the cause of action arose and shall be a lien upon the
property of such corporation as of that date, and shall take
precedence and priority over any mortgage, deed of trust or
other security given to secure the payment of bonds made by
such railroad or street railway corporation. The statute further provides that its provisions are applicable only if action
is commenced within two years from the time that the injury
was sustained.
A judgment obtained in compliance with the terms of the
statute takes precedence over a railroad mortgage issued subsequent to the statute's enactment but prior to accrual of the
plaintiff's cause of action.6 3 If a sale instead of a mortgage
of railroad property is involved, since the lien of the judgment relates back to the date the cause of action accrued,
a transferee acquiring title subsequent to the accrual of the
cause of action therefore takes subject to such lien. In such a
case the purchaser takes the property with an inchoate statutory lien upon it, and such a purchaser cannot claim a want
of notice.64
J. Dower
Suppose that A conveys land to B by a proper deed which
is not recorded. Thereafter A sells and conveys the same land
to C, who purchases without notice of the prior deed to B.
Clearly the recording act protects C as against B, but does it
also protect him as against the dower interest of B's wife?
62. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 58-744 [36 STAT. 1363
(1930), 22 STAT. 415 (1897), 17 STAT. 791, 835 (1882) ).
63. Southern Ry. Co. v. Bouknight, 70 Fed. 442 (4th Cir. 1895).
Among other cases see Link v. Receivers of Seaboard Airline Ry. Co.,
73 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir. 1934).
64. Henry Mercantile Co. v. Graham, Sheriff, 108 S. C. 125, 93 S. E.
331 (1917). Cf. Clark v. Smith, 13 S. C. 585 (1879), which held that a
purchaser of land burdened with a statutory lien for which there was no
provision for recording (the no longer existent purchase money lien on
land sold in partition) took subject to the lien despite his lack of actual
notice.
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In South Carolina it has been held 65 that the failure of the
husband to record his deed in no way prejudices the dower
interest of the wife. Not only is this result unfortunate as a
matter of policy because destructive of the integrity of the
recording system, but the court's rationale in support of the
result is questionable. As a general rule dower is a derivative
estate, subject to defects or defeasances existent in the husband's title at the time the right of dower attaches. 6 It
would appear, therefore, that a defeasance of the grantee's
title resulting from a failure to record likewise should be held
to defeat the dower interest of the grantee's spouse. A decision of the Indiana court 67 to this effect seems preferable
to the result reached by the South Carolina court as a matter
of logic as well as of policy.
K. Other interests createdwithout a written instrument
It is familiar law that in a number of situations other than
those hereinabove discussed 6s interests in land can be created
without the employment of a written instrument. Thus such
65. Pickett v. Lyles, 5 S. C. 275 (1874); Sondley v. Caldwell, 28 S. C.
580, 6 S. E. 818 (1888). Dower being a legal interest, the defense of
bona fide purchase of the legal title without notice is inapplicable. McMorris v. Webb, 17 S. C. 558, 43 Am. Rep. 629 (1882); Sondley v. Cald-

well, supra.

66. See monograph, Dower & Curtesy as Derivative Estates, which
is an appendix to RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY Vol. I; Annot., 25 A. L. R.
2d 333 (1952).
67. Alexander v. Herbert, 60 Ind. 184 (1877), wherein, construing
recording and dower statutes very similar to the South Carolina statutes,
the court said (at p. 187), "at common law, title to land passed by a duly
executed deed of conveyance. Under the statutes of Indiana, the title
passes by the delivery of such deed, subject to be divested in consequence of the negligence of the grantee, in failing to perform, in due
time, a certain act, required of him after the delivery to him of the
deed, viz.: filing the same in the proper recorder's office for record.
"It will be here observed, that the wife does not take title [to her
dower interest] by a conveyance to her, but by operation of law, through
a conveyance to her husband. She must therefore take it subject to all
conditions and infirmities attaching to it in the hands of her husband.
Her title cannot, in reason, be more perfect than his, from which hers is
derived.... [WIhen he fails to perform the act of filing it in the recorder's office, whereby his title is lost, as against a bona fide purchaser
from his grantor, that of his wife must, under the statutes, go with his.
There is no equity in giving her preference over such a purchaser. The
object of the statute, in preventing secret liens and claims of title,
would be thwarted by any other construction. Sound policy requires the
adoption of the construction we give the statutes." However, the widow
of a deceased grantee under an unrecorded deed is entitled to dower
as against subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers for value with
notice of the unrecorded deed. Sutton v. Jervis, 31 Ind. 265 (1869);
Brannon v. May, 42 Ind. 92 (1873); Johnson v. Miller, 47 Ind. 376
(1874).
68. See pp. 356-365, supra.
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interests may arise by oral gift 69 or sale,7 0 estoppel, 71 constructive72 or resulting trust,7 3 rights of reformation of an instrument,1 4 the right of reinstatement of a mortgage discharged
by reason of mistake or fraud,7 5 the right of a grantor to es-

tablish that his deed in form an absolute conveyance was intended as a mortgage,7 6 and possibly in other ways. It would

77
seem that the specification in the South Carolina statute
of interests in land required to be recorded does not encompass

interests created in any of the above ways, and that as to such

interests, therefore, priorities must be determined under the

rules applicable in the absence of statute. 8 In so far as these

69. As to parol gifts of land, see Knight v. Stroud, 212 S. C. 39,
46 S. E. 2d 169 (1948), s. c. 214 S. C. 437, 53 S. E. 2d 72 (1949) ; Note,
2 S. C. L. Q. 185 (1949).
70. As to parol sales of land, see Annot., 101 A. L. R. 923 (1936);
Note, 8 YEARBooK OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 65 (1947).
71. See, among other cases, Tarrant v. Terry, 1 Bay 239 (S. C. 1792);
Marines v. Goblet, 31 S. C. 153, 9 S. E. 803 (1889) ; Latimer v. Marchbanks, 57 S. C. 267, 35 S. E. 481 (1900); Southern Ry. v. Day, 140
S. C. 388, 138 S. E. 870 (1926) ; Piedmont and Northern Ry. v. Henderson, 216 S. C. 98, 56 S. E. 2d 740 (1949).
72. Among other South Carolina cases, see All v. Prillaman, 200 S. C.
279, 20 S. E. 2d 741, 159 A. L. R. 981 (1942); Searson v. Webb, 208
S. C. 453, 38 S. E. 2d 654 (1946).
73. Larisey v. Larisey, 93 S. C. 450, 77 S. E. 129 (1913). See Caulk
v. Caulk, 211 5. C. 57, 43 S. E. 2d 600 (1947); Legendre v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 215 S. C. 514, 56 S. E. 2d 336 (1949).
74. Among other South Carolina cases, see Austin v. Hunter, 85
S. C. 472, 67 S. E. 734 (1910) ; Sullivan v. Moore, 92 S. C. 305, 75 S. E.
497 (1912) ; Byrd v. O'Neal, 106 S. C. 346, 91 S. E. 293 (1917) ; Mathis
v. Hair, 112 S. C. 320, 99 S. E. 810 (1919).
75. Among other South Carolina cases, see Hutchinson v. Fuller,
67 S. C. 280, 45 S. E. 164 (1903) ; Young v. Pitts, 155 S. C. 414, 152 S. E.
640 (1930); McCraney v. Morris, 170 S. C. 250, 170 S. E. 276 (1933);
Maxwell v. Epton, 177 S. C. 184, 181 S. E. 16 (1935). A mortgage discharged by reason of mistake or fraud will not be reinstated against a
subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the
mistake or fraud. City Council of Charleston v. Ryan, 22 S. C. 339
(1885); Quattlebaum v. Black, 24 S. C. 48 (1885); Werber v. Cain, 71
S. C. 346, 51 S. E. 123 (1905); Gullick, Probate Judge, v. Slaten, 169
S. C. 244, 168 S. E. 697 (1933).
76. Jones v. Hudson, 23 S. C. 494 (1885); Shuford v. Shingler, 30
S. C. 612, 8 S. E. 799 (1889); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 38 S. C. 410, 17
S. E. 218 (1893); Bristow v. Rosenberg, 45 S. C. 614, 23 S. E. 957
(1896) ; Blackvell v. Mtg. Co., 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 395 (1902) ; Francis
v. Francis, 78 S. C. 178, 58 S. E. 804 (1907); Manigault v. Lofton, 78
S. C. 499, 59 S. E. 534 (1907) ; Folk v. Brooks, 91 S. C. 7, 74 S. E. 46
(1912); Lodge No. 13, Joint Stock Co. v. Brown, 112 S. C. 468, 100 S. E.
144 (1919); Mason v. Finley, 129 S. C. 367, 124 S. E. 780 (1924);
Jones v. Eichholz, 212 S. C. 411, 48 S. E. 2d 21 (1948).
77. CODE o LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101, quoted at p.
355, supra.
78. See pp. 350-351, supra, for a discussion of priorities in the absence of statute.
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interests are treated as legal ones,7

9

it appears that they

would prevail over subsequent interests created in favor of
bona fide purchasers for value without notice. 80 On the other
hand, in so far as the interests created by any of the above
transactions are equitable, 81 as to such interests the equitable
doctrine of bona fide purchase seems still in effect, and a
subsequent purchaser for value of the legal title without notice
of the equity will take free thereof. 82 Whether or not possession of the land by the equitable claimant is sufficient to
charge the subsequent purchaser with notice of the equity is a
query which later will be considered.8

3

IV
PARTIES PROTECTED BY THE RECORDING ACT

A. In general
The text of the recording act provides that an instrument
required thereby to be recorded only from the date of its re-

cording "shall be valid so as to affect the rights of subsequent creditors (whether lien creditors or simple contract

creditors) or purchasers for valuable consideration without
notice.... ",84 The following treatment of parties protected
by the recording act will consider first, purchasers for valu-

able consideration, second, subsequent creditors, and third,
the notice which will remove a party from the protection of
the act.
79. Although equitable in origin, estoppel in pais is a legal issue to
be tried by a jury. See Southern Railway v. Howell, 89 S. C. 391, 71
S. E. 972 (1911), and the cases therein cited; Piedmont and Northern
Ry. Co. v. Henderson, 216 S. C. 98, 56 S. E. 2d 740 (1949). However,
it seems that despite the fact that equitable defenses or doctrines have
been adopted by the law, they do not become legal in the sense that they
cease to be subject to the doctrine of bona fide purchase of the legal title.
See 2 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY § 226 p. 525; WALSH, EQUITY 90-94. In
South Carolina a parol gift of land not perfected by adverse possession
for the statutory period can create only an equitable interest. Knight
v. Stroud, 212 S. C. 39, 46 S. E. 2d 169 (1948), s. c. 214 S. C. 437,
53 S. E. 2d 72 (1949). A parol contract for the sale of land is enforceable only in equity. See White v. McKnight, 146 S. C. 59, 143 S. E.
552, 59 A. L. R. 1297 (1928) ; Carson v. Coleman, 208 S. C. 406, 38 S. E.
2d 147 (1945); Annot., 59 A. L. R. 1305 (1929). For authorities to the
effect that interests created by way of constructive and resulting trust,
rights of reformation of an instrument, and reinstatement of a mortgage are equitable, see notes 69 through 75, supra.
80. See p. 350, supra.
81. See note 79, supra.
82. See p. 350, supra.
83. See p. 387, infra.
84. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101.
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85
B. Purchaserfor valuable consideration

The rule in South Carolina as to who can qualify as a purchaser for valuable consideration under the recording act has
been thus stated: "To entitle one to take advantage of the
plea that he is a purchaser for value without notice, it is necessary for him to show three things: (1) That the purchase
money was actually paid before notice of outstanding incumbrances or equities (giving security for the payment is not
sufficient, nor is past indebtedness a sufficient consideration) ; (2) that he has purchased and acquired the legal title,
or the best right to it, before notice of outstanding incumbrances or equities; and (3) that he purchased bona fide

without notice."8 6
Value must have been paid by the purchaser, and "good"
consideration as distinguished from "valuable" consideration
is insufficient to sustain the plea.87 While the consideration
paid need not represent the full market value of the land in
order that the purchaser be protected, yet if the consideration
paid or recited is merely a nominal one it seems that the
grantee cannot claim as a purchaser for value.88 Moreover,
the fact that the consideration paid is grossly inadequate may
be some evidence to the effect that the purchase was not in
good faith and without notice. 89
The consideration must have been paid rather than merely
secured to be paid before notice of the outstanding prior in85. A mortgagee is entitled to the protection afforded in equity to
purchasers for valuable consideration without notice. Haynsworth v.
Bischoff, 6 S. C. 159 (1875). Likewise a mortgagee is a purchaser under
the recording act. Norwood v. Norwood, 36 S. C. 331, 15 S. E. 382, 31
Am. St. Rep. 875 (1892).
86. Mr. Justice Blease in Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 36, 134
S. E. 859 (1926), quoted in Cook v. Knight, 173 S. C. 278, 283, 175
S. E. 506 (1934), and in Jones v. Eichholz, 212 S.C. 411, 422, 48 S. E.
2d 21 (1948).
87. Cook v. Knight, 173 S.C. 278, 175 S.E. 506 (1934). See Wamburzee v. Kennedy, 4 Des. 474, 478 (S. C. 1814); Swan v. Ligan, 1
McC.Eq. 227, 232 (S.C. 1826). A devisee is not a purchaser for value
and takes subject to an unrecorded lease executed by the testator. First
Presbyterian Church v. York Depository, 203 S.C. 410, 27 S.E. 2d 573
(1943).
88. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1301 (3rd ed. 1939); 4 AmERIcmA

LAW Or PROPERTY § 17.10. In Cook v. Knight, 173 S.C. 278, 175 S. E.
506 (1934), the deed (by an aunt to her niece) recited a consideration of
"one dollar and love and affection." The niece was held not to be a
purchaser for value, the court finding it to be conceded by the litigants
that the recited consideration had not been paid and that the grantee
was a mere volunteer.
89. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1301 (3rd ed. 1939). See Cruger v.
Daniel, McM. Eq. 157, 197 (S.C. 1841).
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terest, or else the subsequent grantee cannot qualify as a

purchaser protected under the recording act.90 Thus the subsequent grantee's promissory note in the hands of his grantor
as payee is not value within the requirement of the rule, since

the court can relieve the grantee maker from payment of his
obligation upon a showing that title to the property has
failed. 91 If the instrument representing the purchase price

is nonnegotiable, the same result will follow even though the
grantor has assigned the instrument before notice to the
grantee of the outstanding prior interest, since defenses available to the obligor against the assignor can be asserted against

the assignee. 92 However, if the note is a negotiable one, it

90. Dillard v. Crocker, Speers Eq. 20 (S. C. 1842); Garrett v. Garrett, 1 Strob. Eq. 96 (S. C. 1846). See cases cited in note 86, supra.
In Tuten v. McAlhaney, 106 S. C. 328, 91 S. E. 328 (1917), a grantee
of land, who had obtained his deed by undue influence, subsequently
conveyed a portion of the land to a bona fide purchaser who paid a part
of the purchase price and gave a purchase money mortgage securing
a note for the balance. After the death of the defrauded grantor his
heirs sued to set aside both deeds. The circuit court set aside the deed
to the fraudulent grantee, but refused to set aside the latter's conveyance of part of the tract to the subsequent purchaser. Instead, the
fraudulent grantee was required to account for the cash portion of the
purchase money he had been paid, and to transfer the note and mortgage
securing the balance thereof to the administrator of the deceased
grantor. On appeal only by the fraudulent grantee the circuit decree
was affirmed.
An optionee of land is not a purchaser for value. Blackwell v. Mtg.
Co., 65 S. C. 105, 115, 43 S. E. 395 (1902) (circuit court decree).
91. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1303 (3rd ed. 1939); 4 AmEmcAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.10. Annots., 109 A. L. R. 163, 170 (1937); 124
A. L. R. 1259 (1940). In Richardson v. Chappell, 6 S. C. 146 (1875), a
purchaser from a devisee was protected as a bona fide purchaser without notice of the claims of creditors of the testator under Statutes 3
and 4 W. & M. Ch. 14 (CODE OF LAws OF SoUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §
19-704), despite the fact that the purchase price was in part represented by notes of the purchaser payable to the devisee. This case would
seem to have no application where the question of bona fide purchase
arises under either the equitable doctrine or the recording act, rather
than under the Statutes 3 and 4 W. & M. Ch. 14.
In Hardin v. Melton, 28 S. C. 38, 45, 4 S. E. 805 (1888), it is suggested by way of a dictum that a grantee who merely has given security
to the grantor for payment of the purchase price may be treated as a
purchaser for value if the deed contains no covenants for title. The
suggestion seems meritorious if collision is to be avoided with the rule
that

"

. . . it is one of the most settled doctrines of the law that a

purchaser who has received no covenants which cover the defect or incumbrance can neither detain the purchase money nor recover it back
if already paid. Unless there has been fraud or mistake, he is absolutely without relief against his vendor, either at law or in equity."
RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE § 321 (5th ed. 1887). See Annots., 5
L. R. A. 45 (1889); 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445, 458 (1907); 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 363, 385 (1909).
92. Among other South Carolina cases, see Maybin v. Kirby, 4 Rich.
Eq. 105, 113 (S. C. 1851); Moffatt v. Hardin, 22 S. C. 9, 29 (1884);
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seems that the grantee will be protected as a purchaser for

value if the grantor has transferred it to a holder in due course
prior to notice to the grantee of the outstanding prior in93
terest.

If the purchaser has paid the entire purchase price before
notice of an outstanding prior interest but has not acquired
the title, subsequent notice of the outstanding interest before
acquisition of the legal title as a general rule will defeat the
94
purchaser's claim to protection under the recording act.

If the purchaser has acquired the legal title and paid part
but not all of the purchase price before notice of the outstanding prior interest, it seems the better view is that he
should be protected to the extent of the payments made by him

before receiving notice. 95 However, it may be that this view
Trimmier v. Valley Falls Mfg. Co., 85 S. C. 13, 16, 66 S. E. 1053 (1910).
2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 432 (rev. ed. 1936).
93. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.10; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1303 (3rd ed. 1939).
94. South Carolina cases to the effect that the legal title must have
been acquired before notice of the outstanding equity include Cruger v.
Daniel, McM. Eq. 157 (S. C. 1841); Shultz v. Carter, Speers Eq. 533
(S. C. 1844) ; Bush v. Bush, 3 Strob. Eq. 131 (S. C. 1849) ; Brown v. Wood,
6 Rich. Eq. 155 (S. C. 1853); Lynch v. Hancock, 14 S. C. 66 (1880);
Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 134 S. E. 859 (1926). 4 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 17.10; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1306 (3rd ed. 1939).
But even though the purchaser has not acquired the legal title he will
be protected if he has "the best right to it." Among other South Carolina
cases see Black v. Childs, 14 S. C. 312, 318 (1880); Kirton v. Howard,
137 S. C. 11, 36, 134 S. E. 859 (1926) (quoted at p. 368, sup-ra). For
discussion of what is meant by "the best right" to the legal title, see
5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1261 (3rd. ed. 1939); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES Part 1 § 885; 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 312; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS

§ 312.

Examples from other jurisdictions include the purchaser at an execution sale who receives notice after payment of the purchase price but
before execution and delivery of the sheriff's deed. Duff v. Randall, 116
Cal. 226, 48 Pac. 66, 58 Am. St. Rep. 158 (1897), and other cases cited
in 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 312, note 5. But compare Bank of the State of
S. C. v. S. C. Mfg. Co., 3 Strob. 190 (S. C. 1848); Leger v. Doyle, 11
Rich. 109 (S. C. 1857). The purchaser under a deed invalid for want
of written acknowledgment who obtained the signature of the acknowl-

edging officer after notice has likewise been protected. Hume v. Dixon,
37 Ohio St. 66 (1881). Also it seems that a purchaser who has paid
the purchase price but at the time he receives notice has not yet obtained
possession of a deed delivered in escrow will be protected. See Dodds v.
Hills, 2 H. & M. 424, 427 (1865). 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES Part 1
§ 885; 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 312.
No South Carolina cases illustrative of the best right exception to
the general rule have been found. But see Sweatman v. Edmunds, 28
S. C. 58, 5 S. E. 165 (1888), which may represent a very questionable
application of the exception.
95. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.10; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1305 (3rd ed. 1939) ; Annots., 109 A. L. R. 163, 166 (1937);
124 A. L. R. 1259, 1261 (1940). See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 303.
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is not law in South Carolina, and that in this state a purchaser who has paid but part of the purchase price before notice to no extent will be protected. 96
By virtue of statute97 a recorded mortgage for future advances (either obligatory or at the lender's option) enjoys
priority over subsequent creditors and purchasers 98 without
notice to the same extent as if such advances had been made
as of the date of execution of the mortgage.9 9 However, it is
not clear whether or not, in order to comply with the provisions of the statute, a mortgage must state that it is one for
future advances and also the maximum amount to be secured

thereby. 100

In South Carolina the rule seems to be that a conveyance
taken solely in satisfaction of, or a mortgage taken as security

for, a pre-existing debt does not qualify the creditor as a
purchaser for value. 101 Furthermore, it may be that the
96. Law v. Smith, 120 S. C. 468, 113 S. E. 298 (1922). See Black v.
Childs, 14 S. C. 312, 318 (1880). In Zorn v. RR, 5 S. C. 90, 96 (1874),
the decree of the circuit judge contains the following: "If the purchaser has paid no part of it [the purchase price], then the plea is null;
if he has paid a part of it, he is entitled to protection pro tanto." Cf.
Wagner v. Sanders, 49 S. C. 192, 27 S. E. 68 (1897). The statement in
the Black case that the full consideration must have been paid is dictum.
It seems that the statement in the Law case may likewise be treated, if
the court so desires, since the decision is readily explainable on the
ground that the purchaser had notice at the time of sale. Statements
in Ellis v. Woods, 9 Rich. Eq. 19, 25 (S. C. 1856), and Ellis v. Young,
31 S. C. 322, 325, 9 S. E. 955 (1899), even if assumed to imply that a
purchaser acquiring the legal title but not paying the full consideration
before notice will not be protected pro tanto, are mere dicta.
97. 38 STAT. 1475 (1934), embodied in CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 § 45-55.
98. It would seem that by judicial construction the protection of the
statute should not be extended to advances made after actual notice of a
conveyance of the land by the mortgagor.
99. Prior to the statute a mortgage given to secure future advances
was postponed to a later mortgage given for a present consideration,
as to advances made by the first mortgagee after notice of the second
mortgage. See National Bank of Chester v. Gunhouse, 17 S. C. 489
(1882). As to whether or not the recording of the later mortgage afforded constructive notice to the prior mortgagee, the South Carolina
cases are not harmonious. See discussion of these cases in note 194,
infra.
100. Absent the statute, a mortgage given to secure unlimited future
advances is valid. Ex parte American Fertilizing Co., 122 S. C. 171, 115
S. E. 236 (1922). Annot., 81 A. L. R. 631 (1932).
101. Zorn v. RR, 5 S. C. 90 (1874); Haynsworth v. Bischoff, 6 S. C.
159 (1875); Marsh v. Ramsey, 57 S. C. 121, 35 S. E. 433 (1900); Heyward-Williams Co. v. Zeigler, 106 S. C. 425, 91 S. E. 298 (1917); Oliver
v. McWhirter, 112 S. C. 555, 100 S. E. 533 (1919). See Young v. Pitts,
155 S. C. 414, 421, 152 S. E. 640 (1930). Contra: Norwood v. Norwood,
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grantee of a deed executed both for a present consideration
and in satisfaction of an antecedent indebtedness to no extent
will be protected as a bona fide purchaser. 0 2 However, it

seems that a mortgagee who takes a mortgage securing both
a present loan as well as an antecedent indebtedness will be

103
protected to the extent of the present loan.
Whether or not a mortgage given a creditor in consideration
of his agreement to extend the time for payment of an antecedent debt or to forbear in bringing suit qualifies the creditor
as a purchaser for value appears not to have been decided
in South Carolina. 04 In most states it seems that under these
circumstances the creditor will be protected as a purchaser
for value. 05
A third party purchaser of land at an execution sale apparently takes free from any equitable claim or claims based on
unrecorded instruments of which he had no notice, he being entitled to the same protection that is afforded a purchaser at
a private sale. 106 However, if the judgment creditor himself
purchases at the execution sale it seems that in South Carolina
07
he is not protected as a purchaser for value.

36 S. C. 331, 343, 15 S. E. 382, 31 Am. St. Rep. 875 (1892), wherein
it is said: "ItIhis court, therefore, now announces that a secret mortgage, or a mortgage not recorded, is displaced in lien by a mortgage subsequently delivered and duly recorded, even if the debt secured by the
recorded mortgage is an antecedent indebtedness." (Emphasis supplied.)
The above statement is quoted with approval in Perkins v. Loan &
Exchange Bank, 43 S. C. 39, 47, 20 S. E. 759 (1895), and the same
principle is said to be equally applicable to a transfer in satisfaction
of an antecedent indebtedness. On this one point the Norwood and Perkins cases seem to be irreconcilable with the earlier and later South
Carolina cases.
102. See Oliver v. McWhirter, 112 S. C. 555, 100 S. E. 533 (1919);
Law v. Smith, 120 S. C. 468, 113 S.E. 298 (1922).
103. Gibson v. Hutchins, 43 S.C. 287, 21 S.E. 250 (1895).
104. In Haynsworth v. Bischoff, 6 S. C. 159, 168 (1875), the court
said: "It will not be necessary to consider whether forbearance alone
is sufficient consideration to support the claim of a purchaser for value
in equity, for the defendant has not established the existence of any
such consideration."
105. Annot., 39 A. L. R. 2d 1088 (1955).
106. McKnight v. Gordon, 13 Rich. Eq. 222 (S. C. 1867); Miles v.
King, 5 S. C. 146 (1873); Ludden & Bates Southern Music House v.
Dusenbury, 27 S. C. 464, 4 S.E. 60 (1887); Williams v. Jones, 74 S.C.
258, 54 S. E. 558 (1906). Contra: Gulf Refining Co. v. McCanless, 118
S. C. 6, 109 S. E. 801 (1921). This last case is opposed to the great
weight of authority in so far as it holds that a stranger purchasing at a
sheriff's or judicial sale is not a bona fide purchaser protected by the
recording act. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.30; 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 1309 (3rd ed. 1939).
107. Shultz v. Carter, Speers Eq. 533 (S.C. 1844); Williams v. Hollingsworth, 1 Strob. Eq. 103 (S.C. 1846). See Zorn v. Railroad Company, 5 S. C. 90, 97 (1874). But ef. Ingram v. Belk, 2 Strob. 207 (S.C.
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Is a mortgagee purchasing at a foreclosure sale to be treated
as a purchaser for value under the recording act? For example, 08 suppose 0 mortgages Blackacre to M by duly recorded
mortgage. Thereafter 0 purchases from C under an unrecorded conditional sale agreement a furnace which he installs
in the residence on Blackacre so as to become a fixture thereto,
subject only to C's conditional sale agreement. Thereafter M's
mortgage is foreclosed and Blackacre is bid in at the foreclosure sale by M, who takes title without notice of C's unrecorded conditional sale agreement.'0 s8 Is M protected as a
subsequent purchaser for value without notice of C's lien on
the furnace?
If Blackacre had been purchased at the foreclosure sale by
B, a third party, it is clear that the recording act would have
protected B against the unrecorded conditional sale agreement.10 9 As concerns M, the mortgagee, however, it may be
argued that he is not a subsequent purchaser since the value
paid by him (the mortgage loan) was prior to the unrecorded
conditional sale agreement and not subsequent thereto. Analogous to the situation of a judgment creditor purchasing at an
execution sale," 0 it was held in one case"' (which apparently
is still controlling)1 2 that a mortgagee purchasing at a foreclosure sale is not a subsequent purchaser for value, and therefore, that C prevails over M in the hypothetical case put.
1847), holding a purchase by the plaintiff under a voidable execution
to be entitled to the same protection afforded a purchase by a stranger.
The cases from other jurisdictions are conflicting. See 4 ABIERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 17.30; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1309.
Of course, if the judgment creditor himself is within the protection
of the recording act, the fact that he purchased at the execution sale is
immaterial. See Herring & Co. v. Cannon, 21 S. C. 212 (1884); Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 233 (1914).
108. Another example, suppose 0 gives M a mortgage drawn to cover
after-acquired land. Thereafter 0 purchases Blackacre from B and
gives a purchase money mortgage which B fails to record. Thereafter
M's mortgage is foreclosed and Blackacre is bid in at the foreclosure
sale by M, who takes title without notice of B's unrecorded purchase
money mortgage.
108a. As to the record of a conditional sale agreement or chattel
mortgage on fixtures constituting constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser of the realty on which such fixtures are installed, see page
401, infra.
109. See Liddell Co. v. Cork, 120 S. C. 481, 113 S. E. 327 (1922).
110. See note 107, supra.
111. Zorn v. RR, 5 S. C. 90 (1874).
112. Two subsequent cases raise some doubt. In Perkins v. Loan &
Exchange Bank, 43 S. C. 39, 20 S. E. 759 (1895), 0 gave the assignor
of the defendant a duly recorded chattel mortgage covering afteracquired property. Subsequently 0 purchased certain machinery from
the plaintiff under an unrecorded title retention contract. In a contest
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C. Purchase from heir or devisee" 3

Suppose that 0 conveys land to A by a deed which A fails
to record. Thereafter 0 dies, whereupon B, in reliance upon
O's title of record and without notice of the prior conveyance
to A, purchases from O's heir or devisee. There is authority 1 4
holding that in this situation the recording act does not protect B from A's unrecorded deed, on the theory that the conveyance to A having divested 0 of his entire interest, O's
heir or devisee therefore had nothing to convey to B. Such a
result is not only unfortunate as a matter of policy, but also
rests upon unsound reasoning1l4 ' Accordingly, the view of
the cases"5 affording protection to B is to be preferred. No
between the plaintiff and the defendant, who as assignee of the chattel
mortgage had seized the machinery after default and before notice of
the title retention contract, held, for the defendant. The ground for
the decision seems to be not that a mortgagee purchasing at a foreclosure
sale is to be treated as a subsequent purchaser for value, but that a
secret lien is displaced by a subsequent lien given as security for an
antecedent indebtedness. As authority for this proposition the court
relies on Norwood v. Norwood, 36 S. C. 331, 15 S. E. 382, 31 Am. St. Rep.
875 (1892). But, as pointed out in note 101, supra, on this point the
Norwood and Perkins cases are opposed to both prior and subsequent
South Carolina cases.
A later case, Goodrich Silvertown, Inc. v. Rogers, 189 S. C. 101,
200 S. E. 91 (1938), apparently construes the Perkins case as holding
that a mortgagee purchasing at a foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser for value. However, such an interpretation of the Perkins case
is wholly unnecessary in the decision of the Goodrich case, and in this
latter case the Perkins case is discussed only for the purpose of distinguishing the factual situation therein from that presently before
the court. For a detailed adverse criticism of the Perkins and Goodrich
cases, see Vandiver, After-Acquired Personalty; Priority; Case Criticism, 3 YEAR Boox OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY, Part 2, p. 48 (1939).
113. See generally 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1278 (3rd ed. 1939);
Annot., 65 A. L. R. 360 (1930). Also of interest is Annot., Right of
exec2tor or administratorof insolvent estate to take advantage of failure
to record, or file, or refile a conveyance or mortgage executed by his
decedent, 91 A. L. R. 299 (1934).
114. Hill v. Meeker, 24 Conn. 211 (1855). For other cases see Annot.,
65 A. L. R. 360, 365 (1930). In some of these cases the language of the
jurisdiction's recording act was held to necessitate such a result. See
Webb v. Doe, 33 Ga. 565 (1863).
114a. "It has been considered baffling that a deed executed by the
heir of the grantor in an unrecorded deed may, under the Recording
Acts, take precedence over the earlier unrecorded conveyance, it being
pointed out that since the grantor conveyed all that he had there was
nothing to come to the heir on the grantor's death. Of course that argument proved too much, for the grantor himself had no more upon which
to base a subsequent deed than the heir had. It is a wholly sufficient
answer that the grantor had a power to defeat the unrecorded deed, and
that same power became vested in his heir. The power likewise may
pass to and be exercised by the devisee ... of the grantor." Aigler, The
Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MICH. L. R. 405, 416 (1924) (Professor Aigler's footnotes are omitted).
115. Earle v. Fiske, 103 Mass. 491 (1870); Reddoch v. Williams, 129
Miss. '706, 92 So. 831 (1922).
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D. Protection of a subsequent purchaser against a prior
conveyance recorded after execution but before recordationof the subsequent conveyance
Suppose that A, the record owner of land, conveys to B, but
before B records A makes a second conveyance to C, who pays
value without actual notice 1 6 of the prior conveyance to B.
Thereafter B records his conveyance before C records his subsequent one. Will C be protected as against B despite the fact
that B first recorded? Although under the recording acts of
many states a different result is reached, 117 in South Carolina
it has been held that C will prevail over B despite the latter's
priority of recording." 8 However, the South Carolina law on
the point recently has been altered by the following amendment :1sa to the recording statute, enacted on April 24, 1958,
approved April 28, 1958:
Provided, however, that in case of a subsequent pur-

chaser of real estate, or in the case of a subsequent lien

creditor on real estate or personal property or both, for
valuable consideration without notice, the instrument
evidencing such subsequent conveyance or subsequent
lien must be filed for record in order for its holder to
claim under this section as a subsequent creditor or pur116. In South Carolina notice of an unrecorded instrument will supply
the want of registration. See page 384, infra.
117. The recording acts in some states make recordation the sole test
of priority between successive grantees of the same land from a common
grantor. In such states, therefore, B, having won the race to record,
prevails over C. Under the recording acts of other states the priority
of a subsequent purchaser depends upon his showing not only a lack
of notice at the time of his purchase, but also that he has won the race
to record. In these states B having won the race to record, will prevail
over C despite C's want of notice at the time of his purchase. The acts
of a third group of states make want of notice of the prior conveyance
the sole test of priority between successive grantees, and therefore give
priority to C as a subsequent purchaser without notice, despite his failure first to record. Formerly the South Carolina act was of the third
type. See note 118, infra. However, since the amendment of 1958 (note
l18a, infra) the South Carolina act is of the second type.
Recording acts of the first type commonly are referred to as "race"
acts, of the second type as "notice-race" acts, and of the third type
as "notice' acts. For a detailed discussion of the types of recording
acts and a classification of the acts of the various states see 4 AsluRicAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5. See also Annot., 32 A. L. R. 344 (1924).
118. Williams v. Beard, 1 S. C. 309 (1870); Turpin v. Sudduth, 53
S. C.
S. C. 295, 31 S.E. 245 (1898); S.C. National Bank v. Guest, __, 102 S. E. 2d 215 (1958). See Annot., 32 A. L. R. 344, 351 (1924),
discussing the South Carolina cases.
l8a. Senate Bill No. 762, as amended, amending CODE OF LAWS oF
SouTH CAROLINA,

1952 § 60-101.
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chaser for value without notice, and the priority shall
be determined by the time of filing for record.
It seems improbable that the amendment will be held to affect
11
instruments executed prior to the date of its approval. sb
What effect, if any, it has in bankruptcy and receivership
proceedings,lsc as well as its possible application to other issues arising under the recording statute,l1sd are questions yet
to be determined.
E. Subsequent creditors
The earliest South Carolina recording statute, the Act of
1698,119 made no provision for the protection of creditors, and
under the language of this act it was held that unrecorded
mortgages and deeds of land did not lose their priority as
12 The Act of 1785121
against subsequent judgment creditors.
did purport to make provision for the protection of creditors,
but despite the language thereof the same construction was
placed upon it as previously had been given the Act of 1698.122
In 1843123 the law as to the registration of mortgages was
altered by a provision "[t] hat no mortgage ... of real estate,
118b. Unless provision is made for its retrospective operation, a recording statute usually is construed not to apply to instruments executed
prior to its enactment. See Annot., 121 A. L. R. 909, 911 (1939).
118e. See text supported by notes 153,-154, infra. Since the amendment makes no mention of simple contract creditors, it is improbable
that their rights are thereby affected.
118d. For example, it has been said that in the situation discussed in
section V, C. 4, page 396, infra, B, because he recorded before D, necessarily prevails over the latter under the notice-race type statute established in South Carolina by the amendment of 1958. See 4 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.22; Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 391 (1945). Such a result, however, clearly is subversive of the proper functioning of the recording
system. Cf. note 210, supra. In this situation it seems that a court
should construe a notice-race statute to require not mere priority of
filing for record, but priority of record in the chain of title as well.
Should the amendment be construed not to require priority of record
within the chain of title, it would be tantamount to a statutory affirmance in South Carolina of the rule of Van Diviere v. Mitchell, note 203,
infra, a consummation most assuredly to be avoided. Also, if the amendment requires mere priority of record, it would seem that the desirable
rule of Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corporation (note 206,
infra, and accompanying text) is thereby altered, a result surely not
intended as a consequence of the amendment.
119. 2 STAT. 137 (1698).
120. Ash v. Ash, 1 Bay 304 (S.C. 1793); Ashe v. Livingston, 2 Bay
80 (S.C. 1797); Penman v. Hart, 2 Bay 251 (S.C. 1800); Barnwell v.
Porteus, 2 Hill Eq. 219 (S.C. 1835).
121. 7 STAT. 232 (1785).
122. Smith v. Smith, 1 McC. Eq. 134 (S.C. 1825); Barnwell v. Porteus, 2 Hill Eq. 219 (S.C. 1835); Steele v. Mansell, 6 Rich. 437 (S.C.
1852).
123. 11 STAT. 277 (1843).
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shall be valid so as to affect the rights of subsequent creditors
or purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice, unless the same shall be recorded.., within sixty days from the
execution thereof. .

.

.

"

The construction placed upon this

provision was that thereunder a subsequent creditor of the
mortgagor, who reduced his claim to judgment without notice
of the mortgage, acquired a priority as against the mortgagee
of a prior mortgage recorded out of time.124
Thereafter came the Act of 1876,125 made applicable both to
deeds and mortgages, whereby it was provided that such instruments "shall be valid, so as to affect

. . .

the rights of

subsequent creditors or purchasers for valuable consideration
without notice, only when recorded within forty days . . .
Provided, nevertheless, that.., if recorded subsequent to the
expiration of... forty days, shall be valid to affect the rights
of subsequent creditors and purchasers for valuable consideration without notice only from the date of such record."
Construing this act, it was held 126 by a divided court that under
the provisions thereof an unrecorded mortgage has priority
over a judgment against the mortgagor based upon a debt

contracted prior to the execution of the mortgage but entered
subsequent thereto, the judgment creditor being construed to
be a prior rather than a subsequent creditor. This construction of the recording act is present day law in South Carolina.

27

Under the Act of 1876128 it further was held 129 that a mortgagee whose mortgage was recorded late took priority over
124. See McKnight v. Gordon, 13 Rich. Eq. 222 (1867); Herring & Co.

v. Cannon, 21 S. C. 212, 53 Am. Rep. 661 (1884). In Bloom v. Simms,
27 S. C. 90, 3 S. E. 45 (1887), it was held that under the Act of 1843
a mortgage recorded after the sixty days allowed by the act was void
as to a subsequent purchaser for value without actual notice, the tardy
record of the mortgage affording no record notice to such purchaser.
125. 16 STAT. 92 (1876).
126. Carraway v. Carraway, 27 S.C. 576, 5 S.E. 157 (1888).
127. Armstrong v. Carwile, 56 S. C. 463, 35 S. E. 196 (1900); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Wadford, 232 S. C.

-,

-

S. E. 2d

-

(1958).

Cf. McGhee v. Wells, 57 S. C. 280, 35 S. E. 529, 76 Am. St. Rep. 567
(1900); Williams v. Jones, 74 S.C. 258, 54 S.E. 558 (1906); Finance
Corporation v. McGhee, 142 S. C. 380, 140 S. E. 691 (1927). In Tucker
v. Hudgens, 132 S. C. 374, 129 S. E. 77 (1925), the issue was as to
priority between a chattel mortgage and the lien of a pledge. The
result reached therein, which is inconsistent with that reached in the
above cases, would seem to be based upon a no longer existent provision
of the recording act, i. e., the amendment of 1914 (see text supported
by note 137, infra).

128. 16 STAT. 92 (1876).
129. King v. Fraser, 23 S.C. 543 (1885); S.C. Loan and Trust Co.
v. McPherson, 26 S.C. 431, 2 S.E. 267 (1887).
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creditors advancing credit subsequent to the execution of the
mortgage and without notice thereof, but whose claims were
not reduced to judgment prior to recordation of the mortgage,
the statute being construed to afford no protection to unsecured creditors.
In 1898130 the general recording act was amended to extend
the protection thereof expressly to simple contract creditors.
Since the amendment (which is still effective) 3 ' a simple contract creditor whose debt is contracted after the execution of
a deed or mortgage of land, but before its recordation, will
prevail as against the grantee or mortgagee if the debt is
reduced to judgment and entered 32 prior to notice of or the
recordation of the deed or mortgage. 133
Suppose that the simple contract debt incurred subsequent
to the execution of a mortgage but prior to its recordation is
not reduced to judgment until after notice of or the recordation of the mortgage. Under these circumstances, which of
the two claimants has priority? Prior to the amendment of
1898,134 which expressly undertook to extend the protection
of the recording act to simple contract creditors, it had been
held in King v. Fraserr 35 that the mortgage took priority.
However, after that amendment the court held in Brown 'V.
Sartor 3M that the mortgage and judgment had equal rank.
In 1914 the recording act was further amended by the
proviso "That the recording and record of the above mentioned
deeds and instruments of writing subsequent to the expiration
of said ten days shall, from the date of such record, have the
same effect as to the rights of all creditors and purchasers
130. 22

STAT. 746 (1898).
131. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101.
132. In South Carolina a judgment constitutes a lien on the real estate
of the judgment debtor from the time the judgment or a transcript
thereof is indexed and entered upon the book of abstracts of judgments
in the county where the real estate is situate. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1561. However, a lien on personal property of the
judgment debtor is created only by execution and levy. CODE OF LAWs OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1711 and cases thereunder cited.
133. Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E. 233 (1914). See
Brown v. Sartor, 87 S. C. 116, 120, 69 S. E. 88 (1910). A purchaser at
an execution sale under the judgment thus obtained will prevail despite
actual notice of the prior instrument at the time of his purchase of
the land. Herring & Co. v. Cannon, 21 S. C. 212 (1884); Blackwell v.
Harrelson, supra. Apparently the result was the same prior to the
amendment of 1898, under both the Act of 1843 and the Act of 1876.
See the first two cases cited in note 124, supra.
134. 22 STAT. 746 (1898).
135. 23 S. C. 543 (1885).
136. 87 S. C. 116, 69 S. E. 88 (1910).
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without notice as if the said deeds or instruments of writing
had been executed and delivered on the date of the record
thereof."' 3 7 The interpretation of the act as thus amended was
that the rule of King v. Fraser138 had been reinstated so that,
subsequent to the amendment of 1914, simple contract creditors who extended credit after the execution of a mortgage
but who did not obtain judgment liens until after its recordation were postponed to the lien of the mortgage. 139
Until 1925 the South Carolina recording statute contained a
period of grace (varied from time to time throughout the
years) during which an instrument might be recorded within
a certain time after its execution and still retain its priority
as if recorded at the moment of its execution. In that year
the grace period was eliminated by certain changes in the
language of the statute, including the deletion of the amendment of 1914, and the substitution in its stead of the following: "Provided, That a deed... or other written instrument
shall rank as to the priority thereof from the filing of the
same for record ....,140 Since the Act of 1925 it conceivably
might have been held that the law once again is as it was announced before the amendment of 1914 in Brown v. Sartor.141
The cases 4 2 decided since the amendment, however, have continued to apply the rule of King v. Fraser.43 In two of these
137. 28 STAT. 482 (1914).
138. Note 135, supra.
139. In re Saunders & Co., 272 Fed. 1003 (E. D. N. C. 1921); In re
Syleecau Mfg. Co., 17 F. 2d 503 (W. D. S. C. 1922); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Cross, 17 F. 2d 417 (4th Cir. 1927); Carroll v. Cash
Mills, 125 S.C. 332, 118 S.E. 290 (1923); Tucker v. Hudgens, 132 S. C.
374, 129 S.E. 77 (1925); Baugh & Sons v. Graham, 150 S. C. 398, 148
S. E. 220 (1929) ; Sims v. Ezell, 171 S.C. 256, 172 S. E. 129 (1933). See
Little v. Mangum, 17 F. 2d 44, 45 (4th Cir. 1927). In Industrial Finance
Corp. v. Capplemann, 284 Fed. 8, 12 (4th Cir. 1922), the court declared
the South Carolina law to be "that the rights of subsequent simple
contract creditors for value without notice against conveyances of liens
not recorded as required by the statute accrue when the credit is extended, and cannot be defeated by any subsequent action of the holder
of the secret conveyance or lien." However, in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Cross, supra, itis stated (17 F. 2d 417, 422) that in the Capplemann case "the court did not consider the effect on the registration
statutes of the amendment of 1914 .... .

140. 34 STAT.1 (1925).
141. Note 139, supra.
142. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cross, 17 F. 2d 417 (4th Cir.
1927); Baugh & Sons v. Graham, 150 S. C. 398, 148 S. E. 220 (1929);
Sims v. Ezell, 171 S. C. 256, 172 S. E. 129 (1933). See Tucker v. Hud-

gens, 132 S.0. 374, 129 S. E. 77 (1925).
143. Note 135, supra.
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cases1 44 it may be that because of the factual situations involved the statutory law existent before 1925 necessarily was
applicable. However, no mention of this fact is made, nor
does the court indicate that the law as applied would be inappropriate to a situation arising after the 1925 amendment.
A third case' 45 seems necessarily to determine that the law
was unchanged by the deletion in 1925 of the 1914 amendment, though the opinion makes no reference to this deletion.
Thus the present day law apparently is that a simple contract
creditor who extends credit after the execution of a mortgage
but does not reduce his claim to judgment until after recordation of the mortgage is subordinated thereto.
Must a subsequent creditor claiming the protection of the
recording act against a prior unrecorded lien show that credit
was advanced by him in reliance upon the debtor's apparently
unencumbered interest in the land? While no cases involving
liens upon real estate have been found, 145 as regards personal
property the cases are in conflict, some' 46 stating that the
creditor need not have relied upon the debtor's apparent interest in the chattel, while others 147 are to the effect that unless
credit was extended in reliance upon the creditor's ostensible
interest in the chattel, the subsequent creditor is not entitled
to protection of the recording act. On the basis of these decisions the rule as to real property would seem doubtful.
144, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cross, 17 F. 2d 417 (4th Cir.
1927); Baugh & Sons v. Graham, 150 S. C.398, 148 S.E. 220 (1929).
145. Sims v. Ezell, 171 S. C. 256, 172 S. E. 129 (1933).
S. E.
145a. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Wadford, 232 S. C. -,
(1958), wherein the issue was as to priority between a mortgage
of land and a judgment, the court states by way of dictum "that the
recording statute was intended to protect, against the lien of an unrecorded mortgage, persons who, without notice of it, subsequent to its
execution might reasonably have extended credit to the mortgagor, or
purchased the mortgaged property, in reliance upon his apparently unencumbered ownership," (italics added) citing Carroll v. Cash Mills, note

2d _

147, infra.
146. Wardlaw v. Troy Oil Mill, 74 S. C. 368, 54 S. E. 658, 114 Am. St.
Rep. 1004 (1906). See Fidelity Trust and Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 158 S. C.
400, 155 S. E. 622 (1930). Cf. In re Smith, 48 F. Supp. 866 (E. D. S. C.
1943), discussed in note 153, infra. Cf. Andrews v. Hurst, 163 S. C. 86,
161 S. E. 331 (1931), to the effect that a tax being a debt due the
State, the State is a creditor entitled to the protection of the bailment
statute (CODE OF LAws OF SourH CAR LINA, 1952 § 57-308). See
Stephens v. Hendricks, 226 S. C. 79, 83 S. E. 2d 634 (1954). In this situation it seems that the State need not establish reliance upon the taxpayer's ostensible ownership.
147. Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S. C. 332, 118 S. E. 290 (1923). See
Finance Corporation of America v. McGhee, 142 S. C. 380, 140 S. E.
691 (1927).
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Suppose that A, for valuable consideration, gives a note to
B, secured by an unrecorded mortgage of land. Six months
later A, for value, gives an unsecured note to C. Three months
after the last transaction A conveys the land to C in satisfaction of the note held by C. If C acquired the title to the land
without notice of B's mortgage, is he protected as against the
mortgage? As previously seen, 148 a conveyance in consideration of the satisfaction of an antecedent debt is not a conveyance for value within the meaning of the recording act. However, as against the indebtedness secured by the unrecorded
mortgage C occupies the position of a subsequent unsecured
creditor, whom, since the amendment of 1898,149 the recording
act has purported to protect. Thus, if C had reduced his debt
to judgment before notice of B's unrecorded mortgage, the
lien of the judgment thus acquired would be prior to that of
the unrecorded mortgage. 150 It would seem, therefore, that a
conveyance obtained by C in satisfaction of the note likewise
would have priority, at least to the extent of C's debt. 151 Likewise it would seem that if a mortgage instead of a conveyance
148. See text supported by note 101, supra, and following.
149. 22 STAT. 746 (1898).
150. See cases in note 133, supra.
151. See Armour & Co. v. Ross, 78 S. C. 294, 298, 58 S. E. 941, reh. den.
78 S. C. 294, 58 S. E. 1135 (1907). Certain other South Carolina cases
seem distinguishable. Summers v. Brice, 36 S. C. 204, 15 S. E. 374
(1892), was decided before the Amendment of 1898, which purports to

protect simple contract creditors. Also, the debts in satisfaction of which
the conveyance was taken were incurred prior to the transaction involving the unrecorded mortgage. In Marsh v. Ramsay, 57 S. C. 121,
35 S. E. 433 (1900), the controlling transactions likewise occurred before the Amendment of 1898. Young v. Pitts, 155 S. C. 414, 152 S. E.
640 (1930), involved the question of the restoration of the lien of a
mortgage satisfied of record by mistake as against the claim of priority
by junior mortgagees as purchasers for value. These junior mortgages
had been given to secure antecedent debts. The debt of one mortgagee
had been incurred prior to the erroneous entry of the mortgage satisfaction, but the opinion does not disclose when the antecedent debt of the
other mortgagee had been incurred. The court held that the junior mortgages having been given to secure antecedent debts, the mortgagees
therefore could not qualify as purchasers for value. The court did not
discuss whether or not one of the mortgagees might be protected as a
subsequent creditor, assuming that his debt was created subsequent
to the erroneous entry of the mortgage satisfaction. This may have
been because the evidence established that both the junior mortgagees
had notice of the senior mortgagee's equity of reformation at the time
the junior mortgages were taken. Moreover, even if the junior mortgagees technically could have qualified either as purchasers for value or
as subsequent creditors under the recording act, it is doubtful whether,
under the circumstances, the court would have afforded them priority
over the senior mortgage. See the paragraph of the opinion commencing
at the bottom of page 419 of 155 S. C.
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were taken by C, this later mortgage would have priority over
B's unrecorded mortgage.
Suppose that a simple contract creditor extending credit
subsequent to the execution of an unrecorded instrument affecting the title to land has not, prior to notice of the instrument, improved his position by taking a conveyance of the
land, by securing a mortgage on the land, or by reducing his
claim to judgment. Under such circumstances and despite the
language of the proviso of 1898152 purporting to protect simple contract creditors, it seems that such a creditor is not
protected except in the case of the bankruptcy of the debtor
or the appointment of a receiver. It further seems clear that
the simple contract creditor will be protected by the recording
act if, prior to the recordation of the unrecorded instrument
affecting title to the land, the debtor is adjudicated a bankrupt, in which event the trustee in bankruptcy occupies for
the benefit of all creditors of the bankrupt as against the
holder of the unrecorded instrument, the position of a lien
creditor. 5 3 While a receiver of the debtor's assets appointed
under the South Carolina procedure is not a purchaser for
value, and acquires no greater interest in the property than
the debtor had, yet in so far as the receiver represents simple
contract creditors extending credit subsequent to and without
notice of the unrecorded lien, in the distribution of the assets
of the debtor such creditors will have priority over the claimant under the prior unrecorded lien. 5 4
152. 22 STAT. 746 (1898).
153. The cases to this effect include Industrial Finance Corp. v. Cap-

plemann, 284 Fed. 8 (4th Cir. 1922); In re Tansill, 17 F. 2d 413 (W. D.
S. C. 1922); In re Smith, 48 F. Supp. 866 (E. D. S. C. 1943) (bailment
of goods not recorded in compliance with the bailment statute CODE OF
LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 57-308). In the Smith case it was
held that the trustee in bankruptcy need not show that subsequent

creditors extended credit to the bankrupt in reliance upon his ostensible

title to the goods. Since this decision § 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U. S. C. A. § 70 (c), has been amended to further strengthen the
position of the trustee in bankruptcy. See the amendments of 1950 and
1952. In National Discount Corporation v. Tyson, 247 F. 2d 18 (4th Cir.

1957), certain chattel mortgages had not been recorded until within a

month of the time that the mortgagor was adjudicated a bankrupt. The
court held that under the circumstances repossession of the mortgaged
goods by the mortgagee constituted a voidable preference. It is unlikely
that the 1958 amendment to the South Carolina recording statute affects
the rights of simple contract creditors in bankruptcy and receivership
proceedings. For text of the amendment see page 375, supra.
154. In re American Slicing Machine Co., 125 S. C. 214, 118 S. E. 303

(1923) (interest of conditional vendor under unrecorded title retention
contract held subordinate to claims of subsequent simple contract creditors without notice of conditional vendor's interest) ; Bradley, State Bank
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V
NOTICE

A. In general
Since a relatively early date in the state's judicial history,

the law has been settled that notice of an unrecorded instrument will supply the want of registration, that is, that a person who purchases with notice of an unrecorded instrument
will not be protected therefrom by the recording act.155, 150
Thus the notice which will deprive a subsequent purchaser of
protection under the recording act may be either record notice
or notice other than from the record. The following treat-

ment will consider first, notice other than from the record,
and secondly, the problems incident to record notice.
Examiner v. Guess, 165 S. C. 161, 163 S. E. 466 (1932) (interest of
mortgagee under unrecorded real estate mortgage executed by bank
held subordinate to claims of persons making subsequent deposits of
money and paper for collection).
155. The earliest case found is Warnock v. Wightman, 1 Brev. 331
(S. C. 1804), though in Martin v. Sale, Bailey Eq. 1, 4 (S. C. 1830),
Judge Nott stated "[it has been settled in this State, long before any
of our printed cases, that notice of a previous conveyance, to a subsequent purchaser, was equivalent to recording." The leading case is
Tart v. Crawford, 1 McC. 265 (S. C. 1821), s. c. on a subsequent appeal
1 McC. 479 (S. C. 1821). Among many other cases to the same effect,
see McFall v. Sherrard, Harper 295 (S. C. 1824); Anderson v. Harris,
1 Bailey 315 (S. C. 1829).
156. This result was reached despite the fact that our earlier statutes
made priority of registration the sole test as between competing claimants, with no exception made in the case of a subsequent grantee with
notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance. See 2 STAT. 137 (1698), 3 STAT.
290 (1731), 7 STAT. 232 (1785), the essential provisions of which statutes
are set out above at p. 352, 353, supra.
In Tart v. Crawford, 1 McC. 265, 268 (S. C. 1821), Mr. Justice
Richardson thus rationalizes the holding that actual notice will supply
the want of registration:
"Whenever the subsequent purchaser has received actual notice of
the former conveyance, the end in view has been answered. If with a
knowledge of the former conveyance, he will still purchase the land, he
commits an act of folly or dishonesty, he must either intend to give
away the consideration money, or to defraud the former purchaser of
the land, which he knows to have been fairly purchased by him. To permit him to do so, would be to pervert the character of the law, and to
make it an engine of fraud instead of a safeguard against it."
This interpretation of the South Carolina statute is similar to that
earlier placed by the English Court of Chancery upon the statute of
7 Anne, c. 20 (1708). 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 p. 541. See
Warnock v. Wightman, 1 Brev. 331, 369 (S. C. 1804).
In South Carolina the Act of 1843 (11 STAT. 277) and subsequent
acts expressly provide for the protection only of subsequent creditors
or purchasers for valuable consideration "without notice". See pp. 353,
354, supra.
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B. Notice other than from the record
1. Express notice and notice from rumors
The notice which will remove a subsequent purchaser from
the protection of the recording act may be express notice of
the interest directly communicated to the subsequent purchaser or to his agent,157 or it may be notice merely of facts
sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry. If proof of explicit notice of the outstanding interest is established, it follows as a matter of law that the subsequent purchaser takes
subject to the unrecorded interest. 58 If, however, the circumstances with which it is sought to charge the subsequent purchaser with notice consist merely of less explicit reports or
rumors concerning the title, whether or not the purchaser
is to be so charged with notice depends upon whether such reports or rumors are those which would attract the attention
of a reasonable man and convince him that further investigation of the title was necessary. Thus it has been stated that
"[a] person is bound to take notice of these rumors which
would attract the attention of the reasonable man, but not of
those idle rumors to which a reasonable man would pay no
heed."' 5 9 So a purchaser failing to make further investigation
of circumstances which would be sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man on inquiry is chargeable with such notice
as a reasonably diligent inquiry would have disclosed. 60 However, failure further to investigate reports or rumors which

under the circumstances a reasonably prudent man would not
157. Cruger v. Daniel, MeM. 157, 197 (S.C. 1841) ; Aultman v. Utsey,
34 S. C. 559, 13 S. E. 848 (1891); Southern Ry. v. Carroll, 86 S. C. 56,
67 S. E. 4, 138 Am. St. Rep. 1017 (1910); Oliver v. McWhirter, 112
S. C. 555, 100 S. E. 533 (1919). However, knowledge obtained by an
agent who is engaged in perpetrating a fraud upon his principal will
not be imputed to the principal. Ex parte Mercer, 129 S.C. 531, 125 S.E.
33 (1924).
158. Bell v. Bell, 103 S.C. 95, 87 S.E. 540 (1915), s. c. on an earlier
appeal, 99 S. C. 501, 84 S. E. 369 (1914); McPherson v. McPherson,
21 S. C. 261 (1884).
159. Bell v. Bell, 103 S. C. 95, 100, 87 S. E. 540 (1915), s. c. on an
earlier appeal, 99 S. C. 501, 84 S.E. 369 (1914).
160. Barr v. Kinard, 3 Strob. 73 (S.C. 1848); Maybin v. Kirby, 4
Rich. Eq. 105 (S.C. 1851); Adickes v. Lowry, 15 S.C. 128 (1881), s. c.
on a prior appeal, 12 S. C. 97 (1879); Walker v. Taylor, 104 S. C. 1,
88 S. E. 300 (1916); Cathcart v. Matthews, 115 S.C. 1, 104 S. E. 180
(1920), s. c. on earlier appeals, 91 S. C. 464, 74 S. E. 985, Ann. Cas.
1914A 36 (1912), 105 S. C. 329, 89 S. E. 1021 (1916); Oliver v. McWhirter, 112 S.C. 555, 100 S.E. 533 (1919), s. c. on a prior appeal, 109
S. C. 358, 96 S. E. 140 (1918) ; Kirton v. Howard, 137 S.C. 11, 134 S.E.
859 (1926). See Black v.Childs, 14 S.C.312 (1880).
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so investigate does not constitute notice under the recording
act.16 ' And even though a purchaser has been derelict in fur-

ther investigating circumstances which a reasonable man
would have so investigated, his failure to make inquiry will not
deprive the purchaser of the protection of the recording act
if such investigation would not have disclosed the unrecorded
prior interest. 162
2. Immediate or remote claimant under a quitclaim deed
as a purchaser without notice' 63
Although the law once may have been otherwise, 64 today
it would seem settled in South Carolina that the grantee of a
quitclaim deed and his successors in interest, if otherwise
qualified, are entitled to the plea of bona fide purchaser for
value without notice. 65
3. Possession as inquiry notice' 66
Prior to 1888 a purchaser of land in South Carolina was
under a duty to investigate the possession thereof, and failing
so to investigate, he would be charged with notice of any unrecorded interest which such investigation would have disclosed. 6 7 In that year a statute was enacted which provides

that "[n] o possession of real property described in any instrument of writing required by law to be recorded shall operate as
notice of such instrument. Actual notice shall be deemed and
held sufficient to supply the place of registration only when
such notice is of the instrument itself, or of its nature and
161. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.11 and cases cited therein at
note 13.
162. 4 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.11 at page 566. See Hughson
v. Mandeville, 4 Des. Eq. 87 (S.C. 1810); Black v. Childs, 14 S. C. 312
(1880) ; Martin v. Ragsdale, 71 S.C.67, 78, 50 S. E. 671 (1905).
163. See generally Annot., 59 A. L. R. 632 (1929); 4 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 17.6; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1277 (3rd ed. 1939).
164. See Aultman v. Utsey, 34 S.0. 559, 13 S.E. 848 (1891).
165. Southern Ry. v. Carroll, 86 S. C. 56, 60, 67 S.E. 4, 138 Am. St.
Rep. 1017 (1910) semble; Martin v. Ragsdale, 71 S.C. 67, 77, 50 S.E.
671 (1905) sembie. In these cases the deeds which were held not to
nullify the plea of bona fide purchase without notice actually were deeds
without covenants of general warranty rather than true quitclaim deeds.
166. For a general discussion of this topic see Annot., 13 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 49 (1908).
167. Sheorn v. Robinson, 22 S. 0. 32 (1884); Kairson v. Puckhaber,
14 S.C. 626 (1880); Adickes v. Lowry, 15 S.C. 128 (1881), s. c. on a
prior appeal, 12 S.C. 97 (1879); Biemann v. White, 23 S.C.490 (1885);
Graham v. Nesmith, 24 S. C. 285 (1886); Sweatman v. Edmunds, 28
S. C. 58, 5 S. E. 165 (1888); Daniel v. Hester, 29 S. C. 147, 7 S. E. 65
(1888). See Ellis v. Young, 31 S. C. 322, 325, 9 S. E. 955 (1889);
Tant v. Guess, 37 S. C. 489, 500, 16 S. E. 472 (1892) (circuit court
opinion).
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purport."' 68 The construction which has been placed upon
the statute is that mere possession of land under an unrecorded instrument in writing required by law to be recorded
is not sufficient notice of the interest created by such instrument.160 Despite an unfortunate confusion of the issue in
two recent cases 1 0 involving leaseholds, this construction of
168. 20 STAT. 15 (1888). The text as above given is that found in
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-109, and contains minor
changes in language and punctuation.
169. Foster v. Bailey, 82 S. C. 378, 64 S. E. 423 (1909) (possession
under unrecorded deed); Richardson v. Ellis, 112 S. C. 108, 98 S. E. 846
(1919) (possession under unrecorded deed); Epps v. McCallum Realty
Co., 139 S. C. 481, 138 S. E. 297 (1927) (possession under unrecorded
contract of sale); Van Ness v. Schachte, 143 S. C. 429, 141 S. E. 721
(1928) (possession under unrecorded contract of sale). See Savannah
Timber Co. v. Deer Island Lumber Co., 258 Fed. 777 (E. D. S. C. 1918);
aff'd sub norn. Deer Island Lumber Co. v. Savannah Timber Co., 258
Fed. 785 (4th Cir. 1919). Of course, circumstances other than the possession of land by the claimant under an unrecorded instrument may
be sufficient to charge a subsequent purchaser with notice of the outstanding interest. See Oliver v. McWhirter, 112 S. C. 555, 100 S. E. 533
(1919).
170. Barksdale v. Hinson, 212 S. C. 1, 46 S. E. 2d 170 (1948); Adams
v. Willis, 225 S. C. 518, 83 S. E. 2d 171 (1954). In the Barksdale case
a tenant in possession under a parol lease for one year was protected
as against a subsequent purchaser of the premises without actual notice
of the lease. Two opinions are reported. The rationale of the first
opinion is that an oral lease not to exceed one year is not required to
be recorded, the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1946 [44 STAT. 2584 (1946) ;
CODE oF LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 title 41] not having altered the
prior law, and, therefore, a subsequent purchaser without notice takes
subject to such lease. (In other words, at common law a prior legal
interest prevails over a subsequent one, irrespective of the want of notice
to the subsequent purchaser of the legal title. See page 350, supra.)
The second opinion questions the rationale of the first opinion, and
justifies the decision for the tenant solely on the ground that the subsequent purchaser would be charged with notice of the lease from the
fact of the tenant's possession, and, therefore, that he could not qualify
as a bonn fide purchaser without notice. Since two of the justices concurred in the second opinion and only one in the first, the second is
actually the opinion of the court.
The reasoning of the second opinion seems demonstrably erroneous.
If the recording act does not require a lease for not to exceed one year
to be recorded, the common law rule as to priorities is in effect, and the
lessee as holder of a prior created legal interest will prevail over any
subsequent purchaser, regardless of whether he purchased with or without notice of such prior legal interest. See p. 350, supra. On the other
hand, if the recording act, construed in conjunction with the Landlord
and Tenant Act of 1946, requires the recordation of a lease creating a
term for not to exceed one year, very clearly the Act of 1888 [20 STAT.
15 (1888); CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-109]

pro-

viding that possession under a written instrument required to be recorded is not notice to a subsequent purchaser is applicable. Thus it
seems that the decision of the court properly may be justified only on
the grounds adopted in the first opinion.
In Adams v. Willis, supra, a grantee of a lessor was held to take
subject to an option to purchase the leased premises contained in a
duly recorded lease. After assigning the proper reason for concluding
that the grantee would be charged with notice of the lease, the court
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the act seems settled, at least where the unrecorded instrument is one other than a lease.
4. Possession under a parol equity as notice
Does the Act of 1888171 apply where the claimant in possession is asserting an equitable interest not created by a written
instrument? For example,'7 suppose that A, having made
partial payment of the purchase price, is in possession of
Blackacre under an oral contract of sale. B, without actual
knowledge of A's interest and without an investigation of the
possession, then takes a conveyance for value from 0, the record title holder. Will B be protected under the recording act
as a purchaser for value without notice of A's interest? Prior
to the Act of 1888 it is clear that B would be charged with

notice from the fact of A's possession, regardless of whether
or not B actually knew of such possession. 1 3 Since A's interest is not represented by "any instrument of writing required
by law to be recorded,"1 74 a literal reading of the act would
seem to exclude B from the protection thereof, and, therefore,
it would further seem that he will be charged with notice of
A's interest by reason of the latter's possession. Several
cases

75

subsequent to the act by way of dicta have stated that

it has no application to an equitable interest not created by
added the dictum that the lessee's possession was sufficient to put the
purchaser from the lessor on inquiry, citing the Barksdale case, supra,

as authority. This dictum of the court would seem wholly to overlook
the provisions of the Act of 1888.
171. 20

STAT.

15

(1888);

CODE OF LAWS OF

SOUTH CAROLINA,

1952

§ 60-109.
172. Other examples would include claimants under constructive and

resulting trusts, and donees claiming under parol gifts, and grantors in

possession under absolute deeds intended as mortgages. See notes 69, 72,
73, and 76, supra.
173. See note 167, supra.
174. The text of the Act of 1888 is set out on p. 385, supra.
175. Folk v. Brooks, 91 S. C. 7, 9, 74 S.E. 46 (1912), wherein the
court, per Mr. Justice Woods, said "[w]hen the contract for the purchase of the land is not written and therefore not an instrument required
by law to be recorded this section has no application; and so we have
the somewhat anomalous state of the law that possession of one who
pays the purchase money and takes a formal deed conveying the land
is no notice to subsequent purchasers or creditors of the claim of the
person in possession, while the possession of one who pays the purchase
money and enters under a mere parol contract for conveyance to him
is notice of the equity of the party in possession." To the same effect
is a statement in Oliver v. McWhirter, 112 S. C. 555, 563, 100 S.E. 533
(1919), and one in Farr v. Sprouse, 133 S.C. 93, 130 S. E. 210 (1925).
See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cothran in Epps v. McCallum Realty Company, 139 S.C. 481, 138 S.E. 297 (1927), discussed
in note 176, infra. In Manigault v. Lofton, 78 S.C. 499, 59 S.E. 534
(1907), it was stated that the continued possession by a grantor in a
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a written instrument. On the other hand, in a later case 17 6 it is
declared, again by way of dictum, that under the Act of 1888
a parol equity has no superiority over an equity created by a
written instrument, since the act by necessary implication is
inclusive of parol equities. Therefore, until squarely decided
by the court, whether or not since the Act of 1888 possession
under a parol equity is constructive notice of such equity

to a subsequent purchaser of the legal title is a question which
must be regarded as an unanswered one.
Assuming that in South Carolina possession under a parol
equity still constitutes notice despite the Act of 1888,17 a
number of questions relative to the necessary character of
the possession which will operate as notice remain to be considered. Is human occupancy essential for the possession
which serves as notice, or is such a possession sufficiently
evidenced by other indicia of human activity on the land, such
as the cultivation of crops, the cutting of timber, or the use
of the land for pasturage?178 Is a continuance in possession
by a grantor after his conveyance of the land notice of a
claim hostile to his grantee? 79 Is a joint possession by one
claiming under a parol equity with another having a redeed given merely for security was notice of the grantor's interest,
though the real basis of the decision seems to be actual knowledge by
the subsequent purchaser of the grantor's interest.
176. Epps v. McCallum Realty Co., 139 S. C. 481, 138 S. E. 297 (1927),
wherein it was held that possession under a written but unrecorded contract of sale was not notice of the equity of the vendee in possession,
since such a contract being required to be recorded, possession thereunder was not constructive notice because of the Act of 1888. Mr.
Justice Cothran dissented on the ground that the then language of the
recording act did not require the recordation of contracts of sale, and,
therefore, the Act of 1888 was inapplicable. The court, per Mr. Justice
Blease, refers to the statement by Mr. Justice Woods in Folk v. Brooks,
91 S. C. 7, 9, 74 S. E. 46 (1912), quoted in note 175, supra, as "unfortunate and wholly obiter dicta." Also criticized is Oliver v. McWhirter, note 175, supra, which is declared not to be authority for the
doctrine that possession is notice of a parol equity in land. No mention
is made of Manigault v. Lofton, note 175, supra, and Farr v. Sprouse,
note 175, supra. But see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cothran
in the Epps case, wherein he states that "[a] parol contract accompanied by possession would not come within the Act of 1888 ....
177. 20 STAT. 15 (1888); CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §
60-109.
178. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.15; 5 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1288 (3rd ed. 1939).
179. See Manigault v. Lofton, 78 S. C. 499, 59 S. E. 534 (1907), discussed in note 175, supra; 4 AMERICANV LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.14; 5
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1292 (3rd ed. 1939); Annot., 105 A. L. R.
845 (1936).
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corded interest notice of the parol equity?' 80 Is the possession
of a tenant notice not only of his own interest, but also of
that of his lessor?' 81 These, as well as related questions, have
been raised in other jurisdictions."82 Since not only is there no
body of law on these matters in South Carolina, but also since
the doctrine of possession as notice may have been wholly abrogated by the Act of 1888, no further treatment of these
topics is made herein.
5. Physical condition of land as notice of the existence of
183
easements
Unlike leasehold and freehold estates, which are corporeal
interests, that is possessory, an easement is an incorporeal
84
interest which does not confer a possessory right in land."
Therefore, the problem of the notice of an unrecorded easement afforded a subsequent purchaser from physical indicia
on the land, while related to that of the notice of a corporeal
interest afforded by a possession of the land, is not in all
respects similar thereto.
Despite any doubt which may be entertained relative to
whether or not the recording act is applicable to easements
created by prescription or by implication, 85 it seems clear
that an easement created by express grant must be recorded
if it is to affect the rights of a subsequent grantee of the
servient estate who purchases for value and without notice
of the easement."86
Suppose that an inspection of the land will disclose physical
evidence of the existence of an unrecorded easement constituting a burden thereon. At common law it is generally held"87
that the presence on the land of physical indicia evidencing
the existence of the easement is sufficient to charge the sub180. See Ellis v. Young, 31 S. C. 322, 9 S. E. 955 (1889); Wagener
& Co. v. Brown Bros., 82 S. C. 131, 62 S. E. 513, 63 S. E. 354 (1909).
See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.13; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

§ 1290 (3rd ed. 1939); Annot., 2 A. L. R. 2d 854 (1948); Annot., 105 A.
L. R. 845, 875 (1936) ; 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 115-120 (1908).
181. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.12; 5 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1291 (3rd ed. 1939).

182. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 17.12-17.15; 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §§ 1287-1292 (3rd ed. 1939).

183. The following discussion likewise is applicable to the problem of
constructive notice of profits a prendre from the physical condition of
the servient land.

184. 3 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY § 404.

185. See p. 359, p. 361, supra.
186. See note 48, supra.
187. See Annot., 41 A. L. R. 1442 (1926), s. 74 A. L. R. 1250 (1931).
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sequent purchaser with constructive notice similar to the
notice of a possessory interest afforded by the possession of
land. As regards rights of way for state highways the common law rule by statute' 88 is confirmed in South Carolina,
and the discussion which follows therefore can have no application to such rights of way.
In South Carolina the effect of the Act of 1888189 on such
constructive notice of an incorporeal interest is a query which
must be considered. The text of the act speaks only of notice
afforded by "possession of real property", and since an easement is not a possessory interest, it would seem that the common law rule as to notice of an easement from physical conditions on the land is not thereby altered. On the other hand,
construing the act in view of its purpose to obviate the necessity of a physical inspection of the land and to permit a purchaser to rely upon the record, it would seem that it might
be construed also to change the common law rule of constructive notice of the existence of an easement from physical conditions on the land. No case expressly passing on the question has been found, and several cases' 90 since the Act of 1888
which touch on the matter are inconclusive. Therefore, until
squarely decided by the court, whether or not the act has altered the prior existent law that physical evidence on the land
affords constructive notice of an easement created by an unrecorded instrument is doubtful.
188. " . .. The location, construction or maintenance of any State

highway shall constitute sufficient notice to put all persons . .. on
inquiry as to the right of the State in and to the rights of way for such
State highway." CODE oF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 33-145 [47
STAT. 457 (1951) 1. An earlier enactment of a similar statute is in 36

STAT. 1238 (1930).
189. 20 STAT. 15 (1888); CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952
§ 60-109. The text of the act is set out on p. 385, supra.
190. Harman v. Southern Railway Co., 72 S. C. 228, 51 S. E. 689

(1905); Southern Railway Co. v. Howell, 79 S. C. 281, 60 S. E. 677
(1908); Beck v. Northwestern Railroad Co., 99 S.C. 310, 83 S.E. 335
(1914), 105 S.C. 319, 89 S.E. 1018 (1916); Atlantic & C. Airline Railway Co. v. Limestone Globe Co., 109 S.C. 444, 96 S. E. 188 (1918). In
these cases it was held that a subsequent purchaser of land had notice
of an unrecorded railroad right of way across the land from the physical

evidence of the maintenance and operation of the way. The opinion in
none of these cases makes mention of the Act of 1888, though it appears
that in one of them, Southern Railway Co. v. Howell, supra, counsel
for the defendant subsequent purchaser argued to no avail that the act

had abolished the doctrine of constructive notice from physical condition
of the land. (See summary of appellant's brief in 79 S.C. at page 282.)
It further should be noted that in the Beck case, sup-a, Justice Fraser
dissented (99 S. C. at p. 318) on the ground that the Act of 1888 was
controlling.
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1. In general
As applied to land titles the term "record notice" (sometimes designated "constructive notice," or "constructive notice
from the record") means that certain persons specified in
the recording act will be charged with notice of the contents of
the record, regardless of whether or not they actually have
made an examination of the contents thereof. The South Carolinaact' 91 charges with notice of the record subsequent creditors 92 and purchasers (the term purchasers being inclusive
of mortgagees 93) ; all others, it seems, are not so charged
with record notice. 9 4 In the discussion which follows, referHowever, in all of these cases the railway easements involved had
been created prior to the Act of 1888, and, therefore, it may be argued
that the law existent prior to the act was controlling. Thus in Foster
v. Bailey, 82 S. C. 378, 381, 64 S. E. 423 (1909), wherein it was held that
subsequent to the act possession under an unrecorded deed was not
constructive notice of such deed, the court thus distinguished the railroad easement cases: "Et)he cases of Harman v. Southern Railway,
[supra], and Southern Railway v. Howell, [supra], are not conclusive
for appellant, as the possession under an unrecorded deed in each of
those cases arose at a time when [the rule prior to the Act of 1888 was
applicable], and was a continuing possession at the time the subsequent
deed was made."
In Haselden v. Schein, 167 S. C. 534, 166 S. E. 634 (1932), an action
to enjoin the defendant from obstructing a way across her land, the
defendant asserted, among other defenses, that she had purchased without notice of the way. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the
court, after pointing out that defendant had record notice of the way,
continued, "[m)oreover, the right of way was in open and notorious
use; the slightest inquiry on the part of defendant would have apprised
her of its nature, its extent, and that it was appurtenant to the property
which she was buying and to which it was immediately adjacent." See
also Lane v. Bell Lumber Co., 122 S. C. 140, 149, 115 S. E. 207 (1922).
191. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101.
192. Recording of a deed of land is notice to creditors of the grantor.
Executors of Lott v. De Graffenreid, 10 Rich. Eq. 346 (S. C. 1858).
However, such record is notice only of the deed's execution and contents,
and not of the fact of fraud. Godbold v. Lambert, 8 Rich. Eq. 155
(S. C. 1856); Means v. Feaster, 4 S. C. 249 (1873).
193. See note 85, supra.
194. See general discussion of the nature of recording acts in First
Presbyterian Church of York v. York Depository, 203 S. C. 410, 416
et seq., 27 S. E. 2d 573 (1943). The record of a purported conveyance
in fee simple of the demised land by the tenant is not record notice to
the landlord. See Trustees of Wadsworthville Poor School v. Jennings,
40 S. C. 168, 18 S. E. 257, 891 (1893). But consider Sudduth v. Sumeral,
61 S. C. 276, 289, 39 S. E. 534, 85 Am. St. Rep. 883 (1901), to the
effect that where a stranger goes into possession of land under a recorded deed from one tenant in common purporting to convey the entire
fee in the land, "this is notice to the world that he is claiming the
entire and exclusive interest in the land, and his possession may be
adverse to all the world from the time of its commencement." See
Knotts v. Joiner, 217 S. C. 99, 103, 59 S. E. 2d 850 (1950). For cases
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ence is made only to subsequent purchasers, but it is intended
that such discussion be equally applied to the other persons
afforded notice by the South Carolina statute. In order for the
from other jurisdictions to the same effect, see 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1185 note 73 (3rd ed. 1939). Mr. Tiffany suggests that "ftihis
rule may be based upon the change of possession, and not upon the effect
of a recording statute, or the record of a conveyance thereunder...."
4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra p. 533. For an analysis of other problems
relative to the notice afforded one cotenant by the record of conveyances
to or from another cotenant, see 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra pp. 532-535.
See also Annot., 27 A. L. R. 8, 10, 23, 24 (1923), s. 71 A. L. R. 444
(1931).
The record of a deed by a mortgagor conveying a portion of the
mortgaged land is not sufficient to put the mortgagee on notice of the
grantee's right to have the land retained by the mortgagor first subjected to the lien of the mortgage. See Lake v. Shumate, 20 S. C. 23
(1833); Annot., 110 A. L. R. 65, 71 (1937), and the cases there cited.
However, the record of a conveyance of a portion of the mortgaged
land is notice to subsequent purchasers of other portions, of the equity
in favor of the first purchaser to have later purchased portions first
sold for payment of the mortgage debt. See Annot., 131 A. L. R. 4,
100 (1941), and the cases there cited.
A person advancing money to discharge a prior first mortgage and
taking a new mortgage as security is entitled to subrogation to the lien
of such first mortgage in order to afford him priority over a recorded
second mortgage of which he has no actual notice. Enterprise Bank v.
Federal Land Bank, 139 S. C. 397, 138 S. E. 146 (1927). See James v.
Martin, 150 S. C. 75, 147 S. E. 752 (1929); Annot., 70 A. L. R. 1396,
1398 (1931).
The cases are discordant on the question of whether or not the record
of a junior mortgage is constructive notice to the mortgagee of a senior
mortgage for advances so as to postpone to the lien of the junior mortgage optional advances thereafter made by the senior mortgagee. The
weight of authority is said to be that actual notice to the senior mortgagee is necessary thus to postpone the lien of his mortgage, but a
minority view is that the record of the junior mortgage operates as constructive notice to him. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, § 293; JONES, MORTGAGES, § 372 (7th ed. 1915).
The limited South Carolina authority on the point is conflicting. In
Lake v. Shumate, 20 S. C. 23 (1883), the court in effect adopted the
majority view. However, in the later case of Norwood v. Norwood, 36
S. C. 331, 15 S. E. 382 (1892) the court favored the minority view,
stating (36 S. C. at page 343), "So far as any advances made to [the
mortgagor] by [the senior mortgagees] after [recordation of junior
mortgage], they were made at their peril, for the registry laws of this
State made the record of [the junior mortgage] on that day notice, so
that it was impossible for [senior mortgagees] to avail themselves of the
doctrine of purchasers for a valuable consideration, or subsequent creditors without notice. For this court to hold otherwise would be to nullify
the registry laws of this state." No supporting authority is cited in the
Norwood case, nor is the Shumate case mentioned. A dictum in a subsequent case, Ex parte American Fertilizing Co., 122 S. 0. 171, 176, 115
S. E. 236 (1922), accords with the Norwood case and cites it as authority
on the point.
Since enactment of the statute (CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA,
1952 § 45-55) according priority to a mortgage for advances even as
to optional advances made after notice of a subsequent mortgage, the
question in South Carolina of the effect of recordation of a junior
mortgage on optional advances thereafter made under a senior mortgage
would seem to be academic. For a discussion of the statute, see page 371,
sumra.
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record of an instrument affecting the title to land to operate
as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers, such recordation must be pursuant to statutory authorization. 195 Thus the
record of an instrument whose recordation is not authorized
by law will not operate as constructive notice. 96 Likewise,
no constructive notice is afforded by the record of an instrument not entitled to record because of failure to comply with
the prerequisites of the recording statutes, 97 nor by the record of an instrument invalid because of defective execution. 98
Moreover, even though properly recorded pursuant to statutory authorization, the record of the instrument is constructive notice only if it is in the subsequent purchaser's "chain of
title",199 which is merely another way of saying that it constitutes one of the records which the subsequent purchaser
is charged with the duty of searching. Accordingly, consideration must be given to the problem of what records are considered to be in the chain of title of a subsequent purchaser.
195. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.17; 5 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 1264 (3rd ed. 1939).
196. See Villard v. Robert, 1 Strob. Eq. 393, 400 (S. C. 1847); Brown
v. Wood, 6 Rich. Eq. 155, 174 (S. C. 1853); Bossard v. White, 9 Rich.
Eq. 483, 496 (S. C. 1857); Lynch v. Hancock, 14 S. C. 66, 89 (1880);
Williams & Co. v. Paysinger, 15 S. C. 171, 174 (1881); Arthur v.
Screven, 39 S. C. 77, 80, 17 S. E. 640 (1893); Singleton v. Singleton,
60 S. C. 216, 235, 38 S. E. 462 (1901); Epps v. McCallum Realty Co.,
139 S. C. 481, 502, 138 S. E. 297 (1927). See Annot., Ann. Cas. 1913B

1070, 1071; Annot., 3 A. L. R. 2d 577 (1949); 4 AmERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 17.17, note 9.
197. In re Rosenthal, 238 Fed. 597 (S. D. Ga. 1916) (Assignment of
bond for title not probated), aff'd sub nom. Georgia Railroad Bank v.
Koppel, 246 Fed. 390 (5th Cir. 1917) ; Woolfolk v. Graniteville Mfg. Co.,
22 S. C. 332 (1885) (record of a deed showing on its face that it was
improperly probated before an out of state magistrate); Wood v.
Reeves, 23 S. C. 382 (1885) (record of an unprobated mortgage); Watts
v. Whetstone, 79 S. C. 357, 60 S. E. 703 (1908) (record of deed showing
on its face that it was improperly probated before the grantor as
notary public); Seale Motor Co., Inc. v. Stone, 218 S. C. 373, 62 S. E.
2d 824 (1950) (record of a chattel mortgage showing on its face a defective acknowledgment). See Beck v. Northwestern Railroad Co., 99
S. C. 310, 83 S. E. 335 (1913), 105 S. C. 319, 89 S. E. 1018 (1916) (deed
not probated). Annot., 19 A. L. R. 1074 (1922), s. 72 A. L. R. 1039
(1931). See pages 407-411, infra, for a discussion of what is a sufficient
compliance with the prerequisites of recordation.
198. Harper v. Barsh, 10 Rich. Eq. 149 (S. C. 1858) (mortgage with
only one witness); Mowry v. Crocker, 33 S. C. 436, 12 S. E. 3 (1890)
("an informal and defective paper, which at most amounts only to an
equitable mortgage, and which was improperly recorded"); Arthur v.
Screven, 39 S. C. 77, 17 S. E. 640 (1893) (mortgage without a seal).
Cf. McPherson v. McPherson, 21 S. C. 261 (1884) (record erroneously
omitting seal from a deed). See cases in 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
17.17 note 8.
199. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 17.17-17.26;
5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1265-1274 (3rd ed. 1939).
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What recorded instruments are considered to be in the
chain of title of a subsequent purchaser can best be illustrated
and discussed by reference to a hypothetical chain of title.
Suppose that in 1955 A is purchasing Blackacre from the
record title holder, B. Suppose further that an examination of
the grantee indices discloses that B acquired title from C
by deed dated and recorded in 1945; that C acquired title from

D by deed dated and recorded in 1940; that D acquired title
from E in 1931, and so on. Examining title for A, it is obvious that the grantor index books must be checked in the name
of B for the years 1945 to date, in the name of C for the years
1940 through 1945, in the name of D for the years 1931
through 1940, and so on, the precise limits of search as to each
into him,
party being from the day before the date of the deed
20 0
to the day after the record of the deed out of him.
2. Recorded conveyance from owner whose deed is unrecorded
Suppose that in 1950 B had conveyed Blackacre to X by a
deed X failed to record, and that in 1953 X conveyed to Y,
who duly recorded his deed. Is the record of the deed from
X to Y within the chain of title which A, a subsequent purchaser from B, is charged with the duty of examining? It is
generally held that such a conveyance, either by way of deed
or mortgage, is not within the chain of title of a subsequent
purchaser from B since no reasonable search of the record
will disclose its existence.201 In South Carolina it seems that
the record of such a deed is not within B's chain of title so
as to charge A with constructive notice thereof.202 However,
200. See 3 WEED, NEw YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1358 (3rd ed.
1938), quoted in note 210, iizfra. Search for the full calendar day is only
out of abundance of precaution, however, since in determining priority of
record, fractions of a day are considered. Callahan v. Hallowell, 2 Bay
8 (S. C. 1796) (writs of attachment); Ex parte Stagg, 1 Nott & McC.
405 (S. C. 1819) (real estate mortgage and judgment); Carroll v. Cash
Mills, 125 S. C. 332, 118 S. E. 290 (1923) (title retention contract and
order appointing a receiver); South Carolina National Bank v. Guest,
S. C.
, 102 S. E. 2d 215 (1958) (chattel mortgages).
In James v. Martin, 150 S. C. 75, 147 S. E. 752 (1929), a money
judgment was obtained against a grantor of land subsequent to the conveyance by him. Thereafter the grantee mortgaged the land. In a contest between the judgment creditor and the mortgagee the latter was
held not to have constructive notice of the judgment.
201. 4 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.17; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1265 (3rd ed. 1939).
202. See Smyly v. Colleton Cypress Co., 95 S. C. 347, 78 S. E. 1026
(1913). But see VanDiviere v. Mitchell, 45 S. C. 127, 22 S. E. 759
1895). Levi v. Gardner, 53 S. C. 24, 30 S. E. 617 (1898), would seem
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where the recorded conveyance from X to Y was a mortgage
rather than a deed, the South Carolina court in the case of
VanDiviere v. Mitchell20 3 held that A took subject thereto
despite the fact that B's deed to X was unrecorded, on the
theory that the sole duty imposed upon the mortgagee by the
recording act is the recordation of his mortgage. In view
of the realities of title examination the holding in the Van20 4
Diviere case seems indefensible. However, while a later case
has thrown doubt upon its present day authority, until expressly overruled by decision or statute the holding remains
a potential trap in the path of the hapless purchaser or mortgagee of real property.
3. Conveyance prior to grantor's acquisition of title
Is a subsequent purchaser of land charged with notice by
the record of a conveyance executed by a person in his
grantor's chain of title prior to such person's acquisition of
title? For example, assume that in 1955, A, a purchaser for
value, is conveyed land by B, who acquired title from C by
a deed executed and recorded in 1950. Assume further that
prior to his acquisition of title in 1950, B in 1949 executed
a general warranty deed purporting to convey the premises
to X, who promptly recorded. In South Carolina the law
is clear that as between B and X, B will be estopped to assert
not in conflict with the correct rule. In that case land had been sold at
execution sale on a judgment against the owner of record. Although the
purchase price was paid, the purchaser at the sale acquired only an
equitable interest since he did not obtain a deed. Thereafter the purchaser conveyed his equitable interest by a deed which was recorded.
In a contest between persons claiming through the grantee from the
purchaser at the execution sale and a subsequent purchaser of the
legal title from the judgment debtor, the court held that the subsequent
purchaser was charged with notice of the contents of a recorded conveyance made by the grantee from the purchaser at the execution sale.
The holding would seem explainable on the ground that the judgment
against the record owner being in the chain of title of the subsequent
purchaser [see Hardin v. Clark, 32 S. C. 480, 11 S. E. 304 (1890)], examination of the judgment roll would have disclosed the outstanding
equity of the purchaser at execution sale, in which event further search
of the record would have disclosed the deed in question.
203. 45 S. C. 127, 22 S. E. 759 (1895). See Younts v. Starnes, 42
S. C. 22, 19 S. E. 1011 (1894). It seems clear that a proper construction
of the 1958 amendment to the South Carolina recording statute does not
necessitate continued adherence to the holding in the Van Diviere case.
For text of the amendment see page 375, supra. See also note .18d,

sutpra.
204. Enterprise Bank v. Federal Land Bank, 139 S. C. 397, 402, 138
S. E. 146 (1927).
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his after-acquired title against X, his prior grantee. 2 5 However, as against A, a purchaser for value without actual notice of the deed from B to X, no such estoppel will arise.
The record of the deed from B to X is without the chain of
title which a purchaser from B is bound to search, and, there2
fore, such record is not constructive notice to A. 06
4. Conveyance executed before but recorded after a

subsequent conveyance by grantor
Suppose A, the record owner, conveys to B, but before B
records A makes a second conveyance to C, who has actual
notice of the prior conveyance 207 to B. C records, then B
records; thereafter C conveys to D, a purchaser for value
without actual notice of the deed from A to B. Who is entitled as between B and D? If the contest were between B and
C it is clear that B would prevail despite his failure to record
before the subsequent conveyance to C, since C's actual knowledge would deprive him of the protection of the recording
act.2 8 However, as a purchaser for value without actual notice from a grantee with notice, D is entitled to the protection
of the act,209 unless the record of the deed to B is within the
205. The many South Carolina cases include Reeder ads. Craig, 3 McC.
411 (S. C. 1826); Robertson v. Sharpton, 17 S. C. 592 (1882); Gaffney
v. Peeler, 21 S. C. 55 (1884); Yawkey v. Lowndes, 150 S. C. 493, 148
S. E. 554 (1929) ; Hungerpiller v. Keller, 192 S. C. 329, 6 S. E. 2d 741
(1940). See Annot., 58 A. L. R. 345 (1929), s. 144 A. L. R. 554 (1943).

Somie cases have held the grantor to be estopped by a deed without

covenants of warranty, where the deed purports to convey a certain
estate. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.19; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1232 (3rd ed. 1939). See Reeder ads. Craig, supra; Harvin v.
Hodge, Dud. 23 (S. C. 1837); and Exrs. of Lamar v. Simpson, 1 Rich.
Eq. 71 (S. C. 1844), making no mention of any requirement of covenants of warranty. An estoppel of B to assert an after-acquired title
likewise would have resulted if the deed from B to X had purported to
convey an expectancy. Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264, 84 S. E.
233 (1914); Wallace v. Quick, 156 S. C. 248, 153 S. E. 168 (1930). 3
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.19, 15.20.
206. Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 93 S. C. 254, 75 S. E.
371, L. R. A. 1918C 788 (1912); Blackwell v. Harrelson, 99 S. C. 264,
84 S. E. 233 (1914). See Annot., 25 A. L. R. 81 (1923). 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.22; 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.20; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1234 (3rd ed. 1939). It is unlikely that the
1958 amendment to the South Carolina recording statute will be held to
alter the result of the cited South Carolina cases. For text of the amendment see page 375, supra. See also note 118d, supra.
207. This prior conveyance may be a mortgage or a grant of an easement rather than a conveyance in fee simple.
208. See page 384, supra.
209. See page 406, infra. However, if the applicable recording statute
requires priority of recording as well as purchase without notice (see
text of the 1953 amendment to the South Carolina recording statute at
page 375, supra), it is arguable that D necessarily loses in this situation.
For a discussion of this problem see note 118d, supra.
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chain of title so as to constitute constructive notice to D.
Should the record of an instrument not recorded until after
the executing party on the record has parted with his interest
in the property constitute constructive notice; in other words,
must the title examiner search the indices and records not
only for the period of record ownership by each of the successive owners, but also up to the time of present search as
to each prior owner in the chain? When considered in view
of the realities of title examination the obvious answer to our
hypothetical case would seem to be that the recording of the
deed to B is without the chain of title, and, therefore, that D
prevails over B.210 No South Carolina case considering the
problem has been found, and the cases from other jurisdictions
are divided, 21' with a majority favoring B. Until the question is settled, therefore, the South Carolina title examiner
must reckon with the possibility that ceasing his search of the
records as to a prior owner in the chain of title as of the
date when such owner by a recorded instrument has parted
with title, rather than continuing his search as to each prior
owner until the closing date of the examination, may be an
unwarranted short cut which can result in a loss to his client.
5. Recorded conveyance from owner of a parol equity
as notice
Suppose that 0, owner of Blackacre, conveys the same to
A, who goes into possession, by a recorded deed in form an
210. "The principle of these cases [holding that B prevails over D]
is absurd, because it would necessitate a search to date against every

name in the chain of title. This is never done. Search is only made
against each name, from the day before the date of the deed into him,
to the day after the record of the deed out of him." 3 WEED, NEw YORK
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1358 (3rd ed. 1938), as quoted in Philbrick,
Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 391,
415 (1945). Professor Philbrick then comments: "As already said this
is believed to be true throughout the United States. A legal construction of the recording acts that is utterly inconsistent with the practice
of title examiners is, literally, nothing but a snare for the intending
purchaser who is the intended favorite of those statutes." Philbrick,
op. cit., 415.
211. Among the cases holding for B are Bayles v. Young, 51 Ill. 127
(1869); English v. Waples, 13 Iowa 57 (1862); Woods v. Garnett, 72
Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1894) ; Ryle v. Davidson, 116 S. W. 823 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1908). Among the cases in favor of D are Morse v. Curtis, 140
Mass. 112, 2 N. E. 929 (1885); Bowman v. Holland, 116 Va. 805, 83
S. E. 393 (1914).
The definitive treatment of the problem is that of Professor Philbrick
in Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA.
L. REV. 125, 259, 391-440 (1944-45), wherein the text and case authorities
are collated and subjected to detailed analysis. Brief discussions are
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absolute conveyance, but which is intended only as a mortgage. 212 Thereafter 0 mortgages his retained equitable interest to B, who records. C, without actual notice of the interest
of 0 and B, then takes a mortgage or a conveyance for value
from A, the legal title holder of record. In such a case it
seems that C would prevail as a bona fide purchaser for
value of the legal title without notice of the equities of 0
and B, despite the fact that B's mortgage had been recorded.
The same considerations 213 which should be regarded as controlling in the case of a conveyance executed before but recorded after a subsequent conveyance by a grantor would
seem equally applicable to the present situation. Therefore,

the record of the mortgage by 0 should not be considered
within the chain of title C is required to search. No South
Carolina case 214 expressly deciding the point has been found.
6. Imposition of restrictive covenants upon retained
land in conveyances of other land 21 5
Suppose that 0, in a deed conveying lot one to A, imposes
restrictive covenants 216G on lot two, retained by 0. Does B,
who subsequently purchases lot two from 0 without actual
found in 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.22; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-

ERTY § 1269 (3rd ed. 1939).
212. See text supported by note 76, supra.
213. See page 397, supra.
214. In Lake v. Shumate, 20 S. C. 23 (1883), a deed in form an absolute conveyance was treated by the court as a mortgage. Subsequent
to this deed the mortgagor mortgaged his equitable interest to a second
mortgagee, who duly recorded. The first mortgagee, without actual notice of the second mortgage, thereafter made advances in reliance on
her security interest in the mortgaged land. In a contest between first
and second mortgagees it was held that the record of the second mortgage was not notice thereof to the first mortgagee. However, consider
Norwood v. Norwood, 36 S. C. 331, 15 S. E. 382 (1892), and Ex parte
American Fertilizing Co., 122 S. C. 171, 115 S. E. 236 (1922), discussed
in note 194, supra.
215. See generally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.24; OSBORNE,
MORTGAGES 504; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1266 (3rd ed. 1939);
Annot., 16 A. L. R. 1013 (1922).
216. Where the burden imposed upon retained land is an easement
rather than a restrictive covenant it seems more uniformly to be held
that a subsequent purchaser of the retained land takes subject thereto.
The reason for the different treatment afforded easements and restrictive covenants by some courts is thus explained in Glorieux v. Lighthipe,
88 N. J. L. 199, 96 Atl. 94, Ann. Cas. 1917E 484 (1915): "The case
differs from the conveyance of an easement or any interest that lies
in grant. A grant takes effect regardless of notice; an equitable servitude is the creature of equity alone and depends entirely on the existence
of notice." However, see 4 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.24 and
Annot., 16 A. L. R. 1013 (1922) to the effect that some courts hold the
subsequent purchaser of retained land to take free both of the burden
of easements and restrictive covenants.
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notice of the burden of the restrictive covenants, take subject
thereto by reason of any constructive notice afforded him by
the recording of the deed to A? Stated another way, are
conveyances of other lots by 0, the common grantor, within
the chain of title of B, a subsequent purchaser of land retained
by the common grantor, so that a title examiner for B must
not only examine prior conveyances by 0 to insure that no
double conveyance of lot two has been made, but also to insure that no restrictive covenants have been imposed thereon
as incident to the conveyance of some other lot?
On this question the authorities are divided, with some
holding B to have constructive notice of the imposition of
the restrictive covenants, 217 while others hold that the record
of the deed to A is not within B's chain of title, and, therefore, is not constructive notice to B. 218 Since the question

apparently has not been settled in South Carolina, 219 title examiners would be well advised to proceed on the theory that
prior conveyances of other lots by the common grantor may
be within the chain of title for the purpose of affording constructive notice of restrictive covenants imposed by such
conveyances upon retained lots.
7. Recitals in recorded instruments
A purchaser is charged with notice not only of all recorded
instruments within his chain of title, but also with notice of
are referred
unrecorded instruments affecting the title which
220
to in the recorded instruments within his chain.

217. Selected cases include Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Ati. 216
(1915) ; McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302, 183 N. W. 771, 16 A. L. R.
997 (1921); Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931). For
additional cases see Annot., 16 A. L. R. 1013 (1922); 4 AmERICAN LAw
OF PROPERTY § 17.24, note 2.
218. Selected cases include Hancock v. Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S. E.
872, 16 A. L. R. 1003 (1921); Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. L. 199,
96 Atl. 94, Ann. Cas. 1917E 484 (1915) and Annot.; Buffalo Academy
v. Boehm Bros., 267 N. Y. 242, 196 ,N. E. 42 (1935). For additional cases
see 4 AmERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.24, note 1.
219. In McDonald v. Welborn, 220 S. C. 10, 66 S. E. 2d 327 (1951),
a suit to enjoin the violation of restrictive covenants within a subdivision, the court, in considering the question of notice of the covenants
to the defendants, said (220 S. C. at p. 15), "Defendants overlook that
this instrument was incorporated by direct reference to book and page
of its recordation, not only in the deed by Greene to the defendants, but
in the deeds of all of the purchasers of the 75 lots sold by Willis, the
original owner and grantor" (italics added). The italicized language
may mean the court took the view that conveyances of other lots by
the common grantor are within the chain of title of a subsequent purchaser of another lot. Even if such interpretation is correct, however,
the statement is obviously a dictum.
220. Moyle v. Campbell, 126 S. C. 180, 119 S. E. 186 (1923); Kirton
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8. Variance of name in successive records 22'
In a South Carolina case 222 the evidence established that an
owner of a chattel was known in the community both as
R. C. McKenzie and as W. A. McKenzie. In a contest between successive mortgagees of the chattel the court held
that the record of the chattel mortgage executed in the name
of R. C. McKenzie constituted record notice to the subsequent
mortgagee taking a mortgage under the name W. A. McKenzie. The extent to which the court will apply the same
reasoning in the real property field remains to be determined. 223 However, where title to land is involved it would
v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 134 S. E. 859 (1926); National Bank of Newberry v. Livingston, 155 S. C. 264, 152 S. E. 410 (1930); Young v.
Pitts, 155 S. C. 414, 152 S. E. 640 (1930); McDonald v. Welborn, 220
S. C. 10, 66 S. E. 2d 327 (1951). PATTON, TITLES § 348. However, it
seems that a purchaser is not charged with notice of recitals in satisfied
mortgages of record. See National Bank of Newberry v. Livingston,
155 S. 0. 264, 282, 152 S. E. 410 (1930).
In Hardin v. Clark, 32 S. C. 480, 11 S. E. 304 (1890), it was said that
since a purchaser of land was charged with constructive notice of the
lien of an unsatisfied money judgment against a former owner, he also
was charged with notice of certain facts which inquiry concerning the
judgment would have disclosed. The statement is questionable.
In Green v. Maddox, 97 Ark. 397, 134 S. W. 931 (1911), it further was
held that even though an unrecorded instrument is not referred to in
any instrument of record, yet if a purchaser must derive his title through
such instrument he will be charged with notice thereof. The court
said (134 S. W. at p. 933): "Every purchaser who holds under a conveyance through which he must trace his title is bound by whatever
is contained in it. It is his imperative duty to obtain and examine all
the instruments which constitute essential links in his chain of title,
and he is conclusively presumed to know all the recitals and matters contained therein affecting the title or the estate whether they are recorded or not." To the same effect is Stees v. Kranz, 32 Minn. 313,
20 N. W. 241 (1884). See McDonald v. Welborn, supra, 220 S. C. 10, 16.
See 2 DEVLIN, DEEDS § 1001; OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 525. But cf. Southern
Ry. v. Carroll, 86 S. C. 56, 67 S. E. 4, 138 Am. St. Rep. 1017 (1910),

holding that a purchaser from a life tenant in possession for more than
twenty years under an unrecorded deed would be protected as a bona fide
purchaser if he had no actual notice of his grantor's limited estate.
However, see Davis v. Sellers, 229 S. C. 81, 91 S. E. 2d 885 (1956),
which on this point seems irreconcilable with Southern Ry. v. Carroll.
221. See generally 1 PATTON, TITLES §§ 72-79 (2nd ed. 1957).
222. Brayton v. Beall, 73 S. C. 308, 53 S. E. 641 (1906). Cf. Hauser
v. Callaway, 36 F. 2d 667 (8th Cir. 1929), holding the record of a chattel
mortgage executed in the name of Chester C. Callaway to be constructive notice of a mortgage by Charles Chester Callaway.
223. Indicative of the fact that the same rule might be applied to land
is the court's discussion in the Brayton case, note 222, supra, of Fallon
v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44, 99 Am. Dec. 347 (1869). In the Brayton case the
South Carolina court thus summarizes the facts and holding of the California court in the Fallon case: " ... a lot was granted to an individual
in the name of Darby O'Fallon, a nickname by which he was generally or
often called and known, although his real name was Jeremiah Fallon.
By his true name Jeremiah Fallon conveyed to the plaintiff and the
deed was duly recorded. Subsequently Fallon executed a deed to the
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seem that an entry in the record in a name other than that
in which title to the land was acquired should not constitute
record notice unless the entry in the other name is sufficient
to lead a reasonably careful searcher of the record to make
such inquiry as would disclose the true facts. 224 To hold
otherwise would seem unnecessarily to impair the functioning
of the recording system.
9. Mortgage recorded in deed book as record notice
The South Carolina court has held that recordation in the
deed book of a mortgage in form an absolute conveyance affords record notice of the existence of the mortgage, 225 the
South Carolina statute226 not requiring that deeds and mortgages of real estate be recorded in separate books.
10. Chattel mortgage on fixtures as notice to purchaser
227
of realty
In Liddell Co. v. Cork,228 the facts were that a farm owner
had installed on his farm certain machinery consisting of
engines, boilers, sawmill and a cotton ginning outfit, purchased by him on conditional sale agreements recorded only
in the chattel mortgage book. In a contest between the conditional vendor of the machinery and a subsequent purchaser
of the farm without actual notice of the former's interest, the
conditional vendor was held to have priority. This was on
the theory that despite the fact that the machines had bepremises in the name of Darby O'Fallon to Teal, who conveyed to
Divine, who conveyed to defendant, Kehoe, a purchaser for valuable
consideration and without notice. Under these facts the court held that
the record of the conveyance by Jeremiah Fallon was constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser, although she took deed in good faith,
tracing her title to the name on record by which it was acquired, without notice from the record or otherwise that Darby O'Fallon and Jeremiah Fallon were names of the same person."
224. Compare text and cited cases at the text supported by note 233,

infraL.

225. Cox v. Enterprise Bank, 115 S. C. 191, 104 S. E. 693 (1920).

226. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-57.
227. See generally 4 AmERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.14; 1 PATTON,

TITLEs § 43 pp. 43-47 (2d ed. 1957); BROWN, PERsONAL PROPERTY 802
(2d ed. 1955) ; Annot., 13 A. L. R. 448, 484 (1921), s. 73 A. L. R. 748, 773
(1931). The majority rule is that the record of a chattel mortgage or
conditional sale agreement is not constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser of realty. See authorities cited above. Both the UNIFORn
CONDITIONAL SALES ACT and the UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE (neither
of which is law in South Carolina) provide for the recording of conditional sales of chattels made fixtures to land in the office where land
titles are recorded. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 802 et seq. (2d ed.

1955).

228. 120 S.C. 481, 113 S.E. 327, 23 A. L. R. 800 (1922).
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come fixtures, the recorded conditional sale agreements nevertheless constituted constructive notice to the subsequent purchaser of the realty. Whether or not the same principle is
applicable in situations involving such fixtures as furnaces,
water heaters, etc., installed in dwellings, is open to question.
Such equipment also is frequently sold on conditional sale
agreements, and it may be that a purchaser of residential
realty in like manner is charged with notice of any such agreements recorded in the chattel mortgage book.229
11. Failure to index and misindexing
In several South Carolina cases 23 0 it has been held that

the record of an instrument is constructive notice despite the
fact that the instrument has not been entered on the index.
Since these decisions, the recording statute has been altered
by an amendment providing in part that".., the recordation
of a deed, mortgage or other written instrument shall not be
notice as to the purport and effect thereof, unless the filing
of the same for record be entered as required hereby in the
indexes."1231 While no cases deciding the point have been
229. In Liddell Co. v. Cork, note 228, supra, the court said (120 S. C.
at page 488) : "Granting that the record of an instrument is notice only
to those who are bound to search for it...
it does not follow that the
purchaser of real estate fixtures - property which was once personalty
and which may again become personalty by severance - is under no
obligation to examine the public records for incumbrances which the
owner of the fixtures may have placed thereon before annexation to
the real estate.
"It is a matter of common kmowledge that sawmills, ginning outfits,
and similar machinery are frequently, if not generally, sold on time and
under agreements reserving title in the seller until paid for. The presence of such fixtures in quantity should put a prospective purchaser of
the land upon inquiry as to their history. Instruments covering property
of that character, even if separately recorded pursuant to the express
provisions of the statute in the chattel mortgage book, cannot be said to
be instruments which are not in the line of the title of the real estate to
which such property may be annexed as fixtures."
230. Armstrong v. Austin, 45 S. C. 69, 22 S. E. 763, 29 L. R. A. 722
(1895) (mortgage); Greenwood Loan & Guarantee Assn. v. Childs, 67
S. C. 251, 45 S. E. 167 (1903) (deed); Mitchell v. Cleveland, 76 S. C.
432, 57 S. E. 33 (1907) (deed). See Fretwell v. Pearman, 134 S. C. 545,
549, 133 S. E. 433 (1926).
231. 34 STAT. 85 (1925). The full text as contained in CODE OF LAws
0 SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-156 reads as follows: "The register of
mesne conveyances or clerk of court in those counties where the office
of the register of mesne conveyances has been abolished shall immediately upon the filing for record of any deed, mortgage or other written
instrument of the character mentioned in § 60-101 enter it upon the
proper indexes in his office, which shall constitute an integral, necessary
and inseparable part of the recordation of such deed, mortgage or other
written instrument for any and all purposes whatsoever and this shall
likewise apply to any copy of the indexes made subsequently by the register of mesne conveyances or clerk of court or the deputy of either thereof
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found,232 it would seem unquestionable that unless a deed recorded since the passage of the amendment has been indexed
its record will not afford constructive notice.
It further appears that since the sole purpose of an entry on
the index is to disclose the existence of an instrument to one
making a search of the records therefor, if the entry as made
does not reasonably disclose the instrument's existence, such
entry does not constitute a sufficient compliance with the
1925 amendment, and, therefore, the record of the instrument

will not constitute constructive notice. While no South Carolina cases have been found, in other states making the index
an essential part of the record it has been held that an entry
on the index which fails reasonably to disclose the existence
of the recorded instrument prevents the record from consti233
tuting constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.
12. Failure to record and errors in the record
In South Carolina the mere filing for record of an instrument does not afford constructive notice; until the instrument
is actually recorded no constructive notice is given to persons

subsequently dealing with the property.23 4 Furthermore, if

or by his authority for the purpose of replacing the original indexes.
The entries in the indexes hereby required to be made shall be notice
to all persons sufficient to put them upon inquiry as to the purport and
effect of the deed, mortgage or other written instrument so filed for
record, but the recordation of a deed, mortgage or other written instrument shall not be notice as to the purport and effect thereof unless
the filing of the instrument for record be entered as required hereby

in the indexes."
232. In Fretwell v. Pearman, 134 S. C. 545, 133 S. E. 433 (1926), a suit
arising under the law as it existed prior to the 1925 amendment against
a former clerk of court and his bondsman to recoup a loss to the plaintiff
which resulted from the clerk's failure to index a recorded mortgage,
Justice Cothran in his dissent, after citing the South Carolina cases to
the effect that failure to index does not prevent the record of an instrument from constituting constructive notice, continued, "[a)ttention is
called, in this connection, to the Act of 1925, 34 STAT. 1 (sic) which
manifestly alters the rule announced in these decisions; it has no application, however, to this case."
233. See the cases collected in Annot., 63 A. L. R. 1057, 1064 (1929).
Illustrative cases in which erroneous entries in the index were held
to preclude the record from constituting constructive notice include Howe
v. Thayer, 49 Iowa 154 (1878) (mortgage by Furman, indexed as Freeman); Parry v. Reinertson, 208 Iowa 739, 224 N. W. 489, 63 A. L. R.
1051 (1929) (mortgagor indexed as mortgagee); Dorman v. Goodman,
213 N. C. 406, 196 S. E. 352 (1938), commented on in 52 HARv. L. Rnv.
170 (1938) (deed by J. Frank Crowell indexed as J. L. Crowell); Prouty
v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 74 AtI. 550, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211 (1909)
(mortgage by L. J. Marshall, indexed as S. J. Marshall).
234. Bamberg v. Harrison, 89 S. C. 454, 71 S. E. 1086, Ann. Cas. 1913B
68 (1911) (chattel mortgage filed for record before, but not recorded
until after a subsequent purchase). See Sternberger v. McSween, 14
S. C. 35, 43 (1880).
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the recording officer in recording an instrument incorrectly
copies it in the record, such record will be constructive notice
to a subsequent purchaser only of the instrument as erroneously recorded, 235 unless the error is apparent from the record,
236
in which event the subsequent purchaser is put on inquiry.
13. Recordation in a county other than that in which
the land is situated

The South Carolina recording act 2317 provides that an instrument affecting title to land required by law to be recorded
235. Burriss v. Owen, 76 S. C. 481, 57 S. E. 542 (1907) (chattel mort-

gage as recorded showing a lesser amount due); O'Neill v. Cooper River
Corporation, 109 S. C. 35, 95 S. B. 124 (1918) (timber deed as recorded
showing a shorter period for removing timber); Atlantic Coast Lumber

Corp. v. Langstn Lumber Co., 128 S. C.'7, 122 5. E. 395 (1924) (record
erroneously omitting words of inheritance from a deed held to give constructive notice only of a life estate). See McPherson v. McPherson, 21
S. C. 261, 268 (1884) (record erroneously omitting the seal from a deed
said to give notice only of the deed as recorded); Santee R. C. Lumber
Co. v. Elliott, 153 5. C. 179, 150 S. E. 683 (1929). Cf. Interstate B. and
L. Assn. v. McCartha, 43 S. C. 72, 20 S. E. 807 (1895) (record of a mortgage omitting a clause in the bond secured thereby); Equitable Building & Loan Assn. v. Corley, 72 S. C. 404, 52 S. E. 48, 110 Am. St. Rep.
615 (1905) (record of a mortgage omitting a clause in the bond secured
thereby). See generally Annot., 70 A. L. R. 595 (1931).
In Kennedy v. Boykin, 35 S. C. 61, 14 S. E. 809 (1892), a record
erroneously showing a mortgage to embrace "200 acres, more or less"
instead of "2000 acres more or less", was held to be notice of the correct
acreage to a subsequent mortgagee, apparently on the theory that the
error was immaterial since the acreage was described as "more or
less", and the boundaries were correctly given by the record. See discussion of this case in Interstate Building & Loan Association v. McCartha, supra,in 43 S. C. at p. 77.
236. 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.31, note 36; 41 C. J. 568, note
34; 66 id. 1158, note 96.
237. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101. Section
19-264.1, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, enacted in 1955 (49
STAT. 191), provides: When any last will or testament is filed with the
probate court having jurisdiction a certified copy of same shall likewise
e filed with the judge of probate of every county of the State where
the deceased owned real estate. The legal representative of the estate
shall not be discharged until showing is made to the satisfaction of
the court that the provisions of this section have been complied with.
Davis v. Sellers, 229 S. C. 81, 91 S. E. 2d 885 (1956), was a case in
which the operative facts occurred prior to enactment of the above statute. It was therein held that a will filed in the county where the testatrix
resided was notice to a purchaser of lands of the testatrix situate in
another county, the court ruling that "[tihe general recording statutes"
(the court so designated Title 60 §§ 101 through 109, and Title 60
§ 57) are inapplicable to wills. Regarding § 19-264.1, quoted above,
the court stated "we intimate nothing here relative to its effect and
interpretation". For a discussion of the Davis case see Karesh, Annual
Survey of the South CarolinaLaw of Wills and Trusts, 1956, 9 S. C. L. Q.
160, 162 (1956). Professor Karesh is of the opinion that "[ijt is doubtful, to say the least, whether this [§ 19-264.1, supral is a recording
statute or whether it does more than impede the granting of a discharge for failure to file". Karesh, op. cit. supra 160, 163, note 7.
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must be recorded in the county in which the land is situated.
Accordingly, it has been held 238 that recordation in a county
other than that in which the land is situated does not constitute record notice. However, an exception to the general requirement of recordation in the county where the land lies exists in favor of the State Highway Department. By statute 39
the record of conveyances of rights of way for state highways
and of condemnation proceedings for the acquisition thereof,
kept by the State Highway Department in its offices at Columbia, is sufficient to impart notice just as though such

transactions were recorded in the county where the land is
situate. Other statutes 240 provide that for the convenience
of persons making inquiry, records disclosing certain information as to state highways in the county shall be maintained
in the office of the clerk of court (or register of mesne conveyances) for such county. The failure to keep such record in
the county, or an error in the record as kept, would seem in
no way to impair the notice afforded by recordation in the
State Highway Department's offices in Columbia.
D. Unauthorizedrecords as actualnotice
Whether a record which affords no constructive notice because for some reason 241 it is not entitled to record will constitute actual notice to a purchaser who sees or otherwise
learns of it is a question on which the authorities are not in
accord. 242 The writer has found no South Carolina case
238. Cole v. Ward, 79 S. C. 573, 61 S. E. 108 (1908); s. c. 85 S. C.
259, 67 S. E. 295 (1910). Cf. London v. Youmans, 31 S. C. 147, 9 S. E.
775, 17 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1889), holding the record of a chattel mortgage
recorded in a county other than that in which the mortgagor resided
not to operate as constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the
chattel.
239. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 33-144, 33-145 (47
STAT. 457 (1951)1.
An earlier enactment of a similar statute is in
36 STAT.1238 (1930).
240. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 33-146, 33-146.1.
241. For the reasons which will prevent a record from constituting
constructive notice, see page 391, supra,and pages 407411, infra.
242. Cases holding that knowledge of an unauthorized record does not
give actual notice are Kerns v. Swope, 2 Watts 75 (Pa. 1833); Choteau
v. Jones, 11 Ill. 300, 50 Am. Dec. 460 (1849) ; Nordman v. Rau, 86 Kan.
19, 119 Pac. 351 (1911).
Among cases holding knowledge of an unauthorized record to give
actual notice are Hastings v. Cutler, 24 N. H. 481 (1852); Woods v.
Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1894); Morrill v. Morrill, 53 Vt. 74,
38 Am. Rep. 659 (1880); Parkside Realty Company v. MacDonald, 166
Cal. 426, 137 Pac. 21 (1913).
A detailed analysis of the case and text authorities is found in Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L.
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E. Purchaserswith notice from purchaserswithout notice
As a general rule a transferee acquiring title with notice
of an adverse claim from a transferor who purchased for
value without notice of the claim is entitled to the same protection that his transferor is afforded as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.2 44 This is true even though
REV. 125, 259 et seq. (1945). Professor Philbrick concludes that an
invalid record should be held to impart no actual notice. Philbrick, op.
cit. supra 259, 306. For other discussions of the question, see 4 AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY § 17.28, notes 3 through 9; OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 525;
Annot., 3 A. L. R. 2d 577, 589 (1949).
243. In Bossard v. White, 9 Rich. Eq. 483, 496 (S. C. 1857), the
court stated that while the unauthorized record of a deed is not constructive notice, the record "may surely be regarded as a circumstance not
of itself sufficient, but combined with others to show notice."
In McPherson v. McPherson, 21 S. C. 261 (1884), Mr. Justice McIver
concurred in a holding that a purchaser at a sheriff's sale purchased
with notice, apparently in part on the theory that the purchaser had
actual notice from the unauthorized record of a deed to which expressly
he had been referred.
In Bloom v. Simms, 27 S. C. 90, 3 S. E. 45 (1887), a mortgage recorded
more than sixty days after execution was held, under the Act of 1843,
to afford no record notice to a subsequent purchaser for value. By way
of dictum the court added (27 S. C. at p. 92): "True, it might possibly
have been the means of giving actual notice of its existence to such persons as may have seen the record, if any, but it could not operate as
constructive notice to such as had not seen said record, as it would have
done had it been recorded within the prescribed time under the Act
of 1843."
In Mowry v. Crocker, 33 S. C. 436, 441, 12 S. E. 3 (1890), the court,
per Mr. Justice McIver, said: "We do not, however, wish to be understood as deciding that the fact that a mortgagee has seen upon the
records an informal and defective paper, which at most amounts only
to an equitable mortgage, and which was improperly recorded, is sufficient to affect him with actual notice. Upon that question there seems
to be a conflict of authority, and as it does not, under the view which
we take of this case, properly arise, we do not propose to decide it
now."
In Georgia Ry. v. Koppel, 246 Fed. 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1917), the court,
in affirming the District Court's ruling that an assignment of a bond for
title was improperly recorded under South Carolina law because not
probated, added, "The circumstance that it was actually transcribed in
the records of the county in no way affects the legal proposition involved.
If the parties at interest had actually seen the record of the instrument, they would have been put upon notice of its existence; but the
constructive notice resulting from the record of an instrument follows
only when it is entitled to record."
244. Fretwell v. Neal, 11 Rich. Eq. 559 (S. C. 1859); Southern Ry. v.
Carroll, 86 S. C. 56, 67 S. E. 4 (1910) ; Foster v. Bailey, 82 S. C. 378,
64 S. E. 423 (1909); Goodwin v. Harrison, 231 S. C. 243, 98 S. E. 2d
255 (1957). Cf. MeCandless, Recvr. v. Klauber, 158 S. C. 32, 155 S. E.
141 (1930), holding an assignee with notice from a judgment creditor
who obtained judgment without notice of an unrecorded mortgage to have
priority over the mortgage. See Williams v. Jones, 74 S. C. 258, 262,
54 S. E. 558 (1906) (opinion of circuit judge); Jones v. Hudson, 23
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the transferee is a donee rather than a purchaser for value.2 5
However, if the transferee has previously held the property
subject to the adverse claim his reacquisition of the property
is likewise subject thereto, 246 since to hold otherwise would
permit a purchaser with notice to defraud an adverse claim-

ant by the device of transferring to a bona fide purchaser
and then taking a reconveyance from the latter.
F. Purchaserswithout notice from purchaserswith notice
A purchaser of land without notice of a prior conflicting
claim will be protected therefrom despite the fact that his
247
grantor had notice of the claim.
VI
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLIANCE WITH RECORDING PREREQUISITES

It has already been pointed out 248 that the record of an instrument not entitled to record because of failure to comply
with the prerequisites of the recording statutes will not afford constructive notice. As a consequence, in passing upon
the sufficiency of the record of a title it frequently is necessary for the title examiner to determine Whether the fact that
the record of an instrument in the chain of title shows some
irregularity in the instrument's execution safely may be disregarded as immaterial, or whether such irregularity is a material one vitiating the effect of the record as constructive
notice. Fortunately, in most situations the determination is
not too difficult a one to make, in view of the considerable
body of precedent available.
Certain irregularities unquestionably must be regarded as
material ones disqualifying an instrument for record. Thus
S. C. 494, 501 (1885) ; Brown v. Wood, 6 Rich. Eq. 155, 177 (S. C. 1853) ;
Williams v. Hollingsworth, 1 Strob. Eq. 103, 113, 47 Am. Dec. 527 (S. C.
1846). 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.11 p. 567; 5 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1307 (3rd ed. 1939) ; Annot., 63 A. L. R. 1362 (1929).
245. 2 SCoTT, TRUSTS § 316.
246. See Goodwin v. Harrison, 231 S. C. 243, 98 S. E. 2d 255, 258

(1957). 4 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.11 p. 568; 5 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 1307 (3rd ed. 1939); Annot., 63 A. L. R. 1362, 1372 (1929).
247. Jones v. Hudson, 23 S. C. 494 (1885); London v. Youmans, 31
S. C. 147, 9 S. E. 775, 17 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1889). 4 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 17.11 p. 567; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1308 (3rd ed.
1939).
248. See page 391, supra.
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249
the record of a deed or mortgage having only one witness,
2 0
not under seal, 1 or not bearing the affidavit of a subscribing
witness to its execution 251 (except when by statute an ac-

249. Harper v. Barsh, 10 Rich. Eq. 149 (S. C. 1858) (mortgage of
real estate). Two witnesses are essential to the validity of a deed. Craig
v. Pinson, 1 Cheves 272 (S. C. 1840).
250. Arthur v. Screven, 39 S. C. 77, 17 S. E. 640 (1893) (mortgage
of real estate). Cf. McPherson v. McPherson, 21 S. C. 261 (1884) (record
erroneously omitting seal from a deed).
251. Wood v. Reaves, 23 S. C. 382 (1885) (mortgage of real estate).
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-51 provides:
§ 60-51. Affidavit prerequisite for recording.
Before any deed or other instrument in writing can be recorded in this State the execution thereof shall be first proved
by the affidavit of a subscribing witness to such instrument,
taken before some officer within this State competent to administer an oath. If the affidavit be taken without the limits
of this State it may be taken before (a) a commissioner appointed by dedimus issued by the clerk of the court of common
pleas of the county in which the instrument is to be recorded,
(b) a commissioner of deeds of this State, (c) a clerk of a
court of record who shall make certificate thereof under his
official seal, (d) a justice of the peace who must append to the
certificate his official seal, (e) a notary public who shall affix
thereto his official seal within the State of his appointment,
which shall be a sufficient authentication of his signature, residence and official character, (f) before a minister, ambassador,
consul general, consul or vice consul or consular agent of the
United States of America or (g) in the case of any officer or
enlisted man of the United States Army, Air Force, Navy,
Marine Corps or Coast Guard on active duty outside the continental confines of the United States, any commissioned officer
of said Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard,
if such probating officer shall state his rank, branch and organization.
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 44-475 provides:
§ 44-475. Officers may take affidavits, probates of deeds, etc.
For the duration of World War II and for six months thereafter all verifications of pleadings, probates of deeds and mortgages, proofs of claims, affidavits and renunciations of dower
made or taken before a commissioned officer of the armed
forces of the United States who shall state in writing after his
name his rank and service serial number or before any officer
of the United States Merchant Marine, whether within or without the limits of the United States shall have the same force
and effect as if made or taken before an officer designated in
the appropriate section of this Code as authorized to take the
same and in such cases no official seal shall be necessary.
This section shall be retroactive to December 7, 1941.
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 44-476, enacted in 1955 (49
STAT. 88) provides:
§ 44-476. Officers may act as notaries public.
Any commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the United
States or any officer of the United States Merchant Marine,
serving either within or without the limits of the United States,
may verify pleadings, probate deeds and mortgages, take renunciations of dower, proofs of claims and otherwise act in the
same capacity as a notary public. When acting as such the
officer shall sign his name, rank, serial number and organization and in such cases no official seal shall be necessary. This
section shall be retroactive to December 7, 1941.
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knowledgment2 52 or other affidavit2 53 may be substituted
therefor) does not constitute constructive notice of the existence of such deed or mortgage.
A frequent source of concern is the effect of irregularities
in the affidavit of a subscribing witness to the execution of an
instrument, 54 which in South Carolina is commonly referred
to as the "probate". 255 While the customary procedure is to
have the witness making the affidavit sign his name thereto,
it has been held that such signature by the affiant is not essential to the validity of the probate.256 Further, the failure
of the notary public to complete the probate form by inserting
therein the name of the witness who with the affiant witnessed the transaction has been held to be a mere clerical
omission which may be disregarded. 257 However, where an
acknowledgment was not signed by the party making the
same, the failure of the notary public to insert the name of the
252. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-54 provides:

§ 60-54. Special provision for duration of war.
For the duration of the present war and six months thereafter, it shall be lawful for the clerks of court, registers of
mesne conveyances and all other public officers of this State
whose duty it is, under the law, to file and record written instruments in the nature of verifications of pleadings, proofs of
claims, powers of attorney, conveyances of real estate, mortgages of real estate, mortgages of personal property and renunciations of dower, to do so when the execution of such instrument has been proved by the affidavit of a subscribing witness thereto or by an acknowledgment of same before some
officer or person authorized by the law of this State to administer oaths, regardless of the State or county in which such
instrument may have been executed. When such an instrument
in writing, whether the execution of it has been proved by probate or acknowledgment, has been recorded, such recording shall
constitute notice in the same manner and for the same purpose
as provided by law in this State for recording instruments.
253. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-55 provides:
§ 60-55. When affidavit of subscribing witness cannot be procured.
When the affidavit of a subscribing witness cannot be had by
reason of the death, insanity or absence from the State of such
witness, any such instrument may be recorded upon proof of
such fact and of the handwriting of the parties who signed the
instrument and of the subscribing witnesses by proper affidavit,
the proof in every case to be recorded with the instrument.
254. See generally, Annots., 19 A. L. R. 1074 (1922); 72 A. L. R. 1039
(1931) ; 29 A. L. R. 919 (1924) ; 25 A. L. R. 2d 1129 (1952).
255. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-54 quoted in note

252, supra.
256. Armstrong v. Austin, 45 S. C. 69, 22 S. E. 763 (1895). The same
construction was placed upon the earlier Act of 1788 (7 STAT. 347).
Fuller v. Misroon, 35 S. C. 314, 14 S. E. 714 (1892).
257. Arthur v. Hollowell, 111 S. C. 444, 98 S. E. 202 (1919).
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acknowledgor was held to be fatal to the validity of the ac258
knowledgment.
If the probate or acknowledgment of an instrument is made
within the state before an officer competent to administer an
oath, it seems that the omission of his official title is immaterial.25 9 In the case of a domestic notary public, since the
Act of 1871260 the omission by him of his seal has been immaterial if his official title is affixed to his signature. However, if the probate or acknowledgment is made without the
state before a foreign notary public, the statute prescribes
261
that such notary public shall affix his official seal.
When it appears on the face of an instrument that the officer taking the probate or acknowledgment thereof is disqualified because of interest or for other cause, the record of the
instrument does not operate as constructive notice. 262 However, where such disqualification of the officer was not ap258. Scale Motor Co. v. Stone, 218 S. C. 373, 62 S. E. 2d 824, 25
A. L. R. 2d 1118 (1950) (construing an acknowledgment which had
been executed in Kentucky, purportedly in compliance with the Kentucky statute. The court stated that as executed the acknowledgment
was defective under both South Carolina and Kentucky law.).
259. Carolina Savings Bank v. McMahon, 37 S. C. 309, 16 S. E. 31
(1892); McCreary v. Coggeshall, 74 S. C. 42, 53 S. E. 978, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 433 (1906). Cf. Genobles v. West, 23 S. C. 154 (1885).
260. 14 STAT. 538 (1871), reenacted 27 STAT. 139 (1911). The text
as presently in CODD OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 49-6 reads:
§ 49-6. Seal of office.
Each notary public shall have a seal of office, which shall be
affixed to his instruments of publication and to his protestations. But the absence of such seal shall not render his acts
invalid if his official title be affixed thereto.
In Carroll v. Cash Mills, 125 S. C. 332, 118 S. E. 290 (1923), the omission of a seal from the probate of a title retention contract was held
immaterial in view of the Act of 1871.

261. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CARoLINA, 1952 § 60-51 set out in note
251, supr-a.
262. Woolfolk v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., 22 S. C. 332 (1885) (deed executed in South Carolina but probated before a magistrate in Georgia) ;
Watts v. Whetstone, 79 S. C. 357, 60 S. E. 703 (1908) (probate taken before grantor as notary public).
Prior to the Act of 1938 (40 STAT. 1559) a stockholder of a corporation
was disqualified to act as a notary public in taking an acknowledgment
of any conveyance to or from the corporation. See Tuten v. Alameda
Farms, 134 S. C. 195, 192 S. E. 153 (1937), holding a renunciation of
dower taken before a notary public who was a stockholder in the grantee
corporation to be invalid. The text of the Act of 1938, as presently embodied in CODS OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 49-11 is as follows:
§ 49-11. Not disqualified when stockholder, director, officer or
employee of corporation.
A notary public who is a stockholder, director, officer or entployee of a corporation may take renunciation of dower in any
written instrument, take the acknowledgment or the oath of a
subscribing witness of any party to a written instrument executed to or by such corporation, administer an oath to any
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parent on the face of an instrument, the record thereof was
263
held to afford constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser.

It is provided by statute264 that "[b] efore any deed of concan be placed on record . . . it
veyance of real property .
must have thereon the indorsement of the county auditor that
it has been entered of record in his office." Although by virtue of the statute it is the register's duty not to record a
deed until it bears the auditor's indorsement, if recorded
without compliance with the statute it seems that such record
26 5
nevertheless affords constructive notice.

stockholder, director, officer, employee or agent of such corporation or protest for non-acceptance or non-payment bills of
exchange, drafts, checks, notes and other negotiable instruments
which may be owned or held for collection by such corporation.
But when a notary public is individually a party to an instrument it shall be unlawful for him to take the acknowledgment
or probate to such instrument executed by or to a corporation
of which he is a stockholder, director, officer or employee or to
protest any such negotiable instrument owned or held for collection by such corporation.
Section 2 of the act, which validated probates and other notarial functions performed prior to its passage, is omitted from CODE OF LAWS OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
263. Franklin Savings & Loan Co. v. Riddle, 216 S. C. 367, 57 S. E.
2d 910 (1950) (probate of a chattel mortgage made before a partner
of the mortgagee partnership as notary public). Cf. Dillon & Son Co. v.
Oliver, 106 S. C. 410, 91 S. E. 604 (1917) (subscribing witness who
made the affidavit a member of the mortgage firm).
264. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-56. See also § 60-59.
265. See Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Mayfield, 49 F. 2d 900 (E. D.
S. C. 1929), aff'd 49 F. 2d 906 (4th Cir. 1931). Cf. McNamee v. Huckabee, 20 S. C. 190 (1883).
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